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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In the following report we consider how the employment situation 
of working-age Irish households has changed over a period of 
remarkable economic growth between 1994 and 2000. High levels of 
household joblessness became a matter of public concern in Ireland 
and elsewhere during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
concentration of unemployment and non-employment within 
households meant that many of the unemployed did not have access 
to the protection and support afforded by living with someone in 
employment. Therefore, household joblessness has serious 
implications for the financial situation of households and 
consequently for the psychological well-being of their members. It 
also has important implications for the scale of public support 
necessary to prevent poverty. For a given level of unemployment, a 
concentration of joblessness within households will require greater 
financing because there is no other source of household income.  
We would expect that the high rates of employment growth in 
the mid to late 1990s would have reduced the number of 
households cut off from the labour market. However, in the UK 
and Australia it was found that despite employment growth in the 
mid-1990s the proportion of jobless working age households 
remained stable, while the numbers of households where all adults 
were employed grew substantially. This trend was summed up in the 
phrase ‘more work in fewer households’. In Ireland too, some 
commentators have suggested that the benefits of employment 
growth in the 1990s were concentrated among households that 
already had members in employment. Therefore, it is important to 
examine the nature of changes in household employment in Ireland 
over recent years. 
 
 Here we use data from the Living in Ireland Panel surveys from 
1994 to 2000 to examine how the boom period affected the 
proportions of households without anyone in employment and 
conversely the proportions with all or some adults in employment. 
We consider the composition of households that experience work-
poverty and the factors that increase the risk of being work-poor 
and persistently work-poor. We also examine the consequences of 
household joblessness for income, financial deprivation and for the 
subjective well-being of household members and the manner in 
which this has changed over time. Finally, we address the issue of 
the increasing incidence of employment-rich households.  
Introduction 
Data and 
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 The proportion of working age households in which no member 
was engaged in paid employment fell from 22 per cent in 1994 to 18 
per cent in 1997 and less than 14 per cent in 2000. The decline in 
the incidence of workless households was offset by modest 
increases in the proportions of households in the mixed work and 
all work categories between 1994 and 1997. However, between 1997 
and 2000 the proportion of households in which all adults were in 
paid employment increased sharply, from 36 per cent in 1997 to 49 
per cent in 2000. The proportion of households in which some, but 
not all adults were at work declined from 46 per cent in 1997 to 37 
per cent in 2000.  
A similar trend is noted when we switch to a measure of working 
hours. In 1994, in a third of all households the average working time 
per adult household member was less than 10 hours per week. This 
fell to one fifth of households in 2000. There was a strong increase 
in the proportion of household where working hours per person 
was between 30 and 44 hours suggesting that there has been an 
increase in the proportion of households where all members are 
working full-time.  
Most household types shared in the general trend of a decline in 
worklessness between 1994 and 2000. However, there were a 
number of household types in which there was a particularly marked 
decline in worklessness. In households composed of couples in 
which the youngest child is less than 18 years of age, the rate of 
worklessness fell from 14 per cent in 1994 to 4 per cent in 2000. 
There was also a sharp decline in worklessness in households 
headed by lone parents: from 70 per cent to 41 per cent. The 
principal exception to this general trend occurred among 
households in the ‘other’ category, mainly households of unrelated 
individuals, where the proportion of workless households increased 
somewhat between 1994 and 2000. These trends in household 
joblessness meant that Ireland went from having one of the highest 
rates in the EU in 1985 to a situation in 2002 when Ireland fell 
below the EU average. 
 
 Our study has identified a number of groups among the working 
age population that are vulnerable to the risk of household work 
poverty. These are households where the household reference 
person has one or more of the following characteristics:  
• Aged 55-64 years 
• Lone parent 
• No educational qualifications 
• Has a chronic health problem or disability  
• In the unskilled manual class 
• Single-person household  
Even for these households the risk of work poverty has 
decreased between 1994 and 2000 but they still have a higher 
Trends in 
Household 
Worklessness 
Who Are  
Work-Poor 
Households? 
Risk Factors 
and 
Composition 
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probability of being in this situation than other households. There is 
evidence that while the concentration of joblessness among those 
with no qualifications has decreased, the concentration of 
worklessness among older households and households dependent 
on disability/invalidity benefits increased over time. Our 
longitudinal analysis also showed that these groups are also more 
likely to be persistently work-poor.  
 
 There was a very strong relationship between household 
employment status and income, with workless households strongly 
concentrated at the lowest income levels. In both 1994 and 2000 up 
to 30 per cent of workless households received less than £100 per 
week in year-2000 prices, and over three-quarters of workless 
households received less than £200 per week. In both 1994 and 
2000 between 75 per cent and 80 per cent of workless households 
had incomes in the bottom two deciles of the national income 
distribution. 
When we turned to an analysis of income sources we found that 
the source of income was strongly related to household employment 
status. Workless households derived over 80 per cent of their 
income from social welfare sources. Households in which some or 
all adults worked derived well over 80 per cent of their total income 
from work.  
Among jobless households in receipt of social welfare income, 
unemployment-related payments were the most common type of 
payment in 1994 however, the importance of these payments 
declined over time. In contrast, sickness and incapacity-related 
payments, as well as lone-parents payments became much more 
prominent. By 2000 sickness and incapacity-related payments 
represented the single most important payment among workless 
households followed by lone-parents payments. Within 
unemployment related income, insurance–based Unemployment 
Benefit and activation benefits became more important for workless 
households over the period studied while Unemployment Assistance 
declined in importance, reflecting a decline in long-term 
unemployment.  
 
 Our analysis shows that in both 1994 and 2000 there was a very 
strong association between household employment status and the 
risk of income poverty. Taking the most extreme definition of 
poverty, we found that in 2000 almost three-quarters of households 
where no-one was in employment fell below the 50 per cent line. 
This compares with less than 10 per cent in mixed households and 
only 4 per cent in work-rich households. Similar differences are 
observed using the 60 per cent and 70 per cent poverty lines 
(Chapter 4). 
The relationship between household joblessness and lifestyle 
deprivation and economic strain is similarly strong. For example, in 
2000, 29 per cent of work-poor households were lacking at least one 
Household 
Worklessness – 
Income and 
Income 
Packages 
Poverty, 
Deprivation and 
Subjective Well-
Being and 
Household 
Joblessness 
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basic item compared to only 8 per cent of mixed-work households 
and 6 per cent of work-rich households. However, the level of 
deprivation was considerably lower than in 1994 when over half of 
work-poor households lacked one basic item.  
Given the link between psychological well-being and economic 
strain it is not surprising that our analysis found that the household 
reference person in work-poor households is significantly more 
likely to experience psychological distress, nor that the proportion 
experiencing distress decreased since 1994.   
 
 A key issue in the analysis is whether there has been a 
deterioration in the financial circumstances of the declining group of 
work-poor households over the period 1994 to 2000. On this issue 
the results are somewhat mixed. The differential risk of income 
poverty between work-poor and work-rich households increased at 
the 50 per cent income poverty line but remained the same at the 60 
per cent and 70 per cent lines. When we turn to the indicators of 
deprivation we observed some deterioration in the position of 
jobless households compared to other groups. Although there were 
gains for all groups, the reduction in life-style deprivation between 
1994 and 2000 was much more substantial for the work-rich and 
mixed-work households than the work-poor. This difference was 
particularly noticeable for secondary deprivation, which includes 
access to items such as a car, leisure and social activities, and central 
heating. Therefore, there is evidence of some polarisation in the 
conditions of the work-poor compared to other households. Over 
the period of the study this widening gap was buffered by the 
general improvement in living conditions, as evidenced in the 
decline in deprivation and feelings of economic strain among work-
poor households. However, should this buffer disappear in the 
future the consequences of this polarisation may be significant.  
  
 In Chapter five we examine the role of female employment in 
changing patterns of household employment, particularly within 
couple households. Policy analysts have been interested in whether 
benefit systems discourage the wives of unemployed men from 
taking up paid employment. Others have suggested that changes in 
the employment patterns of couples have been crucial in the 
concentration of paid work in certain work-rich households in other 
countries.  
Our analysis shows that the proportion of households that fit the 
traditional male breadwinner female homemaker arrangement 
declined substantially to one-third of couple households in 2000. In 
contrast, joint breadwinning increased to become the norm for 
married couples.  
The analysis of transitions shows that while changes in the male 
partner’s status cause the majority of moves into household 
joblessness in couple households, women’s transitions are solely 
responsible for 24 per cent of such moves and are jointly 
Polarisation of 
Household 
Conditions  
Coupled 
Transitions – 
The Role of 
Female 
Employment  
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responsible in a further 8 per cent of moves. Women’s moves into 
employment are also responsible for 18 per cent of transitions out of 
work poverty in couple households and 60 per cent of moves from 
mixed-work to work-rich.  
The analyses of couples also shows that the employment status 
of the partner has a significant influence on the probability and 
direction of employment transitions for both men and women. In 
other words, those with an employed partner are more likely to 
enter work while those with an unemployed or non-employed 
partner are more likely to exit employment. Investigation of the 
mechanisms behind this link is a priority for future research.  
 
 While most of the report focuses on work-poor households, the 
substantial increase in work-rich households is also of significance, 
and is raised in discussions about the ‘quality of life’. Our analyses 
show that the proportion of households where all adults of working 
age are employed has increased very significantly in the latter half of 
the 1990s. The increase in full household employment was observed 
for every household type but was most significant among 
households with children under the age of 18. The increase for 
couple households with children was 70 per cent while for lone 
parents it was over 120 per cent. Similarly, the greatest increases in 
working hours were observed among lone and couple parents with 
children under 18 years. 
The increase in paid work among those with caring 
responsibilities raises the possibility of increased time-pressure and 
stress among members of these households and a deterioration in 
work-life balance. In other words, work-poverty may have been 
exchanged for time-poverty. However, when we looked at 
psychological strain and satisfaction with leisure time and 
satisfaction with ‘employment/main activity’ among couples with 
children under 18 years we found that the household reference 
person in work-rich households recorded slightly more positive 
responses than those in mixed-work households. The partner of the 
reference person in work-rich households is also more satisfied with 
main activity than those in mixed-work households but is somewhat 
less satisfied with leisure time. Therefore, there is little sense from 
this limited investigation that people are being pushed unwillingly 
into the labour market.  
The possibility remains that there are sub-groups who are 
experiencing excessive time-demands (e.g. both partners full-time 
with young children, or those experiencing work intensification in 
their jobs). The current data does not contain the information on 
unpaid workloads or working conditions to allow a comprehensive 
evaluation of these issues, however, the general analysis does not 
support a pessimistic reading of the rise in work-rich households.  
Excess Work in 
Households? 

1 
1. HOUSEHOLD WORK 
POVERTY: IRELAND IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
Employment, unemployment and inactivity rates for individuals 
of working age are often used as measures of overall labour market 
performance. However, the standard of living and labour market 
behaviour of individuals will be crucially affected by the 
composition of the households in which they live and the labour 
market situation of other household members. For these reasons the 
pattern of employment within households has been central to recent 
international debates about labour market reforms and poverty. An 
important theme within these debates has been the degree to which 
joblessness is concentrated within households and whether there is a 
growing polarisation between work-rich and work-poor households 
(OECD, 1998). More broadly, there has been a growing interest in 
how trends in labour market participation and changing patterns of 
household formation combine to produce new distributions of 
economic welfare (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; OECD, 1995). 
Unemployed or non-employed individuals who live with 
employed people are less vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion 
because of the possibility of sharing resources within the household. 
In a number of countries including Ireland however, the protection 
afforded by multi-person households was undermined in the 1980s 
and early 1990s by increasing numbers of working age households 
where no member was employed. The concentration of joblessness 
within households has important implications, not only for the 
financial well-being of individual households, but also for social 
policy and the scale of government finance necessary for social 
welfare. For a given level of unemployment in the population, a 
concentration of unemployment within households will require 
greater levels of financing because resources and costs cannot be 
shared between employed and unemployed household members.  
The consequences of the recent economic boom and 
employment growth in Ireland for household joblessness is of 
particular interest. Between 1994 and 2000 the period of reference 
for our study, the number of people in employment rose by 37 per 
1.1  
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cent. However, a number of accounts of the Celtic Tiger era claim 
that the benefits of this economic boom were concentrated among 
an already privileged group while others such as the long-term 
unemployed have been left behind (O’Hearn, 1998; Coulter 2003). 
Therefore, these authors suggest that the boom period has 
attenuated inequalities rather than reduced them. In particular, it has 
been argued that a large proportion of the new jobs created went to 
supplementary or second earners in households or to new job 
market entrants rather than the unemployed and therefore has not 
brought a fall in poverty (O’Hearn, 1998, pp. 137, 138). If this 
assessment is true we would expect that the increases in 
employment over the last decade will have had relatively little impact 
on the rate of household joblessness.  
However, other accounts of recent economic and employment 
changes have been somewhat more optimistic (e.g. O’Connell, 
2000). Over the period 1994 to 2000 the rate of unemployment fell 
from 14.7 per cent to 4.3 per cent (O’Connell et al., 2003). In the 
first half of the 1990s the problem of long-term unemployment 
seemed intractable but between 1994 and 2000 the number of long-
term unemployed fell from 128,000 to 27,000.1 Even a cautious 
interpretation, which recognises the role of state training and 
employment schemes in this reduction (O’Connell, 2000) would still 
suggest that a significant part of the unemployed group did benefit 
from the economic upturn.  
Therefore, there remains an important empirical question on the 
extent to which the employment growth over the latter half of the 
1990s benefited workless households. This is one of the core 
questions addressed in the current study. In this context we are 
interested not only in unemployment trends but also trends in non-
employment since the movement from economic inactivity to 
employment may also be instrumental in reducing household work 
poverty. Furthermore, by investigating the composition and 
characteristics of work-poor households we can shed light on the 
question of which groups have not been able to find work despite 
the increasing job opportunities. 
The debate on rising inequality within the boom period also 
raises another issue regarding the living standards of those 
households without any member in employment compared to other 
households. Therefore, we will also investigate income and 
deprivation levels among work-poor households to see if there has 
been a polarisation in the conditions of those connected and 
unconnected to the labour market. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 LFS and QNHS. The 2000 figure refers to second quarter, March to May. The 
number of long-term unemployed continued to fall to a low of 20,500 in the second 
quarter of 2001. The latest figure for the third quarter of 2003 is 26,700. 
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 The literature on household joblessness has focused on both the 
causes and the consequences of this phenomena. Micro-level studies 
put forward a range of explanations to explain the observed 
concentration of joblessness within couples (Cooke, 1987, de Graaf 
and Ultee, 2000) or more rarely among parents and children (Payne, 
1986). One set of explanations centre on the shared characteristics 
of household members. These suggest that household joblessness 
arises because members, particularly partners tend to resemble each 
other in factors that affect the chances of employment such as class, 
age and education levels (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001). Members of 
a household also tend to compete in the same local labour market 
and therefore share the risks of unemployment within this market. A 
second group of explanations refer to the shared resources of family 
members: having another family member in employment can 
provide material and non-material resources (e.g., job contacts) that 
ease the transition into employment. Cultural explanations such as 
resistance to a reversal of traditional gender roles (Irwin and Morris, 
1993) and the transmission of a weak work ethic between family 
members have also been evoked as a possible reason for the 
concentration of unemployment and non-employment within 
families (Murray, 1990; Wilson, 1987).  
Disincentives within the social welfare system have also been 
pointed to as a possible cause of a concentration of joblessness 
among couples (Cooke, 1987; McGinnity, 2002). Means-tested 
benefits that are adjusted according to partner’s earnings can act as a 
barrier to taking up employment, since the ‘added worker’ must earn 
enough to offset any loss in benefits. This system will particularly 
discourage the uptake of part-time or low paid jobs. Cross-national 
research suggests that the link between partners employment status 
is stronger where benefit regimes impose household means tests 
(Dex et al., 1995; McGinnity, 2002). However, these financial 
disincentives should not operate for those on insurance-based 
benefits nor can they account for a concentration of unemployment 
across family generations because children’s earnings do not affect 
parent’s welfare payments.  
Macro-level studies of household joblessness have highlighted 
demographic change as a cause of increasing household joblessness. 
During the 1990s in the UK and Australia it was noted with 
concern, that improvements in the national employment rate were 
not matched by a corresponding decline in household work-poverty 
and welfare dependency. Instead there was a simultaneous rise in the 
proportion of households in which all members were employed and 
households where no-one was employed giving rise to a polarisation 
between work-rich and work-poor households (Gregg and 
Wadsworth 1996; Dawkins, Gregg and Scutella, 2002). Gregg and 
Wadsworth suggest that this trend was partly due to a change in 
household composition, namely an increase in single adult 
households including lone-parent households, and partly due to the 
rise in part-time opportunities, which are more likely to be entered 
by those with another worker in the household.  
1.2  
Household 
Joblessness – A 
Review of the 
Literature 
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The substantial shift toward part-time work explains around one-quarter of 
the relative deterioration of transition rates into work of those with no working 
household member. (Gregg and Wadsworth, p. 204). 
However, the authors acknowledge that those without another 
employed household member have also lost out in access to full-
time jobs and that the “bulk of the emerging differential….. remains 
unexplained”. 
There has been less research on the consequences of household 
worklessness. While there is a very well-developed literature on 
unemployment and poverty this often focuses on the employment 
status of the head of household alone. Similarly, the literature on the 
link between unemployment and subjective well-being usually 
focuses on the individual. Studies of poverty, however, more 
frequently focus on the household and these find a link between 
poverty and household joblessness (e.g., Muffels, 2000; Jarvis and 
Jenkins, 2000). Russell and Nolan (1999) also found a strong 
relationship between household work situation and both income 
poverty and deprivation across eleven EU countries. The gap 
between the work-rich and work-poor on these measures was 
particularly wide in Ireland (ibid. p. 97). Others have pointed to the 
implications of household worklessness for child poverty. For 
example, Robinson and Burkitt (2001) highlight that one in six 
children in the UK were living in a workless household in 2000 so 
that reaching targets set in relation to child poverty would mean 
tackling this issue.  
A number of authors have broadened the discussion of work-
rich and work-poor households to consider the number of hours as 
well as the number of jobs held. Brannen and Moss (1998) focus on 
parental employment patterns and argue that there has been a 
concentration of paid working hours among certain households due 
to the increases in mother’s weekly hours of employment (p. 233). 
Brannen and Moss also highlight the high levels of unpaid caring 
work among parents aged 25 to 50 years and therefore alert us to 
the possibility that work-rich households may be over-worked. The 
polarisation of parental employment observed is argued to have 
significant consequences for divisions in the living conditions and 
care of children.  
Jarvis (1997) also argues for distinguishing between part-time 
work and full-time work in the polarisation debate, and 
acknowledges the possibility that there are over-employed 
households (which can have dis-benefits). Jarvis also stresses the 
importance of recognising cleavages from a longitudinal perspective 
for example by distinguishing between sporadic and long-term 
employment insecurity in households.  
 
 At the international level, the OECD conducted a major study 
into household joblessness in 1998 (OECD, 1998). The study 
outlined two reasons for focusing on non-employment at a 
household level: first, because many labour supply decisions are 
taken at the household level and second, because this provides a 
1.3 
International 
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‘more appropriate’ basis for judgements about welfare. The OECD 
data, relating to households with at least one adult member of 
working age (15-64 years old), shows that the incidence of workless 
households in Ireland in 1996 was just over 20 per cent, about the 
EU average. But Ireland had the highest rate of joblessness among 
households with children. Between 1985 and 1996 the percentage of 
jobless working-age households increased in all countries examined 
except the Netherlands, the US and Ireland (where there was a 
decrease of less than 1 per cent). In most countries this trend was 
largely driven by changes in household composition, in particular a 
shift towards single adult households.2 Focusing on multi-adult 
households the OECD (p. 21) found “evidence of polarisation of 
employment i.e. of a simultaneous increase in the proportion of 
both workless households and households with at least two adults in 
employment” in nine of the eleven countries examined. 
Table 1: Risk of Non-employment for Working-age Households,  
1985-2000 
 1985 1996 2000 
 % %  
Austria – 16.8 11.8 
Belgium 21.2 24.8 14.5 
Finland – 27.1 – 
France 18.8 21.9 14.3 
Germany 20.5 20.7 13.3 
Greece 18.1 20.1 14.8 
Ireland 20.9 20.4 13.6 
Italy 17.0 20.7 15.6 
Luxembourg 14.7 16.4 9.3* 
Netherlands 21.4 19.7 10.8 
Portugal 12.7 13.3 7.9 
Spain 18.2 20.0 12.6 
United Kingdom 19.8 21.6 16.6 
Source: OECD (1998), Table 1.7; Eurostat (2002); Living in Ireland Survey 2000. 
* Luxembourg 1999. 
 
Data for 2000 provides a more positive picture across the EU. 
This shows a decline in household joblessness in all countries, and 
suggests that Ireland’s position is now midway in Europe. Data 
relating to individuals (as opposed to households) also tell a similar 
story about recent trends. The figures contained in Figure 1.1 show 
that the proportion of individuals in workless households in Ireland 
fell from 16 per cent in 1994 to 10 per cent in 2002. This placed 
Ireland below the EU average of 12 per cent in 2002. 
 
2 Ireland also experienced this rise in the proportion of household types with high 
incidence of joblessness but this was offset by changes in non-employment rates 
within household types.  
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Figure 1.1: Per Cent of Population Aged 0 to 65 in Workless 
Households 
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These figures suggest that the period of recent economic growth 
has led to a situation where Ireland is no longer an outlier in Europe 
in respect of household worklessness. However, it is important to 
understand the process that lies behind these trends at the micro 
level and to identify both the characteristics and the conditions of 
those households who remain work-poor despite the tight labour 
market. This investigation should shed light on some of the reasons 
for their continuing exclusion from the labour market. 
 
 In the following report we consider how the employment situation 
of working-age Irish households has changed over a period of 
remarkable economic growth. Because of the serious implications of 
household joblessness for individuals and society, our main focus is 
on those experiencing ‘work-poverty’. We consider the composition 
of this group, the factors that increase the risk of household work 
poverty and the financial and subjective well-being of these 
households. However, there is a secondary focus on the increasing 
incidence of employment-rich households and the implications this 
might have for individual welfare and social policy. We consider 
whether there has been a polarisation between work-rich and work- 
poor households as experienced in the UK and Australia and 
whether the standard of living of jobless households has fallen 
behind the rest of society. We also follow households’ trajectories 
over time to investigate the decisive factors in moves in and out of 
work-poverty. Finally, we explore the welfare and social implications 
of changes in patterns of household work. 
The report is structured in the following way. In Chapter 2 we 
describe the data and measures of household employment used in 
the study. We also describe the labour market and demographic 
changes which provide an important context for changes in 
household joblessness. Changes in the employment patterns of 
households over the period 1994 and 2000 are then described and 
risk factors for household joblessness are identified.  
1.4  
Outline of 
Report 
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In Chapter 3 we examine the composition of workless 
households. We also compare the income levels of work-poor and 
work-rich households and examine the income sources of these 
households. The financial situation of work-poor households is 
further explored in Chapter 4 when we calculate poverty rates and 
deprivation rates for different household types. We also investigate 
the impact of household employment situation on subjective well-
being. In addition to measuring the impact of work poverty on well-
being we also consider whether employment-rich households show 
signs of strain, which might indicate ‘over-work’ .  
In Chapter 5 we move to a longitudinal analysis of household 
joblessness. Here we use panel data to follow household’s moves in 
and out of work poverty over time. We analyse the factors 
associated with such moves and profile households who experience 
long-term or recurrent worklessness. The chapter also contains an 
additional focus on couple households, in order to consider the 
inter-relationship between partner’s employment status and to 
investigate the role of changes in women’s employment on 
household employment situation. In the final chapter we draw out 
the welfare implications of the very significant changes in household 
working patterns over the period 1994 and 2000, in doing so we 
focus on the experience of important groups such as lone parents, 
families with children, single person households and older people.3 
The final chapter also summarises the results in relation to both the 
polarisation and work intensification debates.  
 
3 As we are concerned here with working age households this means older people 
under the upper age limit of 65 years.  
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2. CHANGING 
HOUSEHOLD 
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS 
In this chapter we outline significant changes in the labour market 
and in household formation patterns that are likely to impact upon 
the prevailing rate of household joblessness in Ireland. In Section 
2.3 we describe the data and the measures of household 
employment used in the study. In Section 2.4 we examine the trends 
in household work poverty over the period 1994 and 2000 and 
identify some of the factors associated with the risk of household 
joblessness. This analysis points to some of the reasons why some 
households have remained work-poor despite recent employment 
growth. In the final section we focus on working hours within 
households and consider whether there has been an intensification 
in working time in some households.  
 
 
CHANGES IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
Before examining trends in the distribution of employment across 
households it is useful to briefly consider the wider labour market 
context. Over the course of the 1990s Ireland experienced rapid 
economic growth and converged with levels of development in 
other advanced European countries. The economic boom resulted 
in unprecedented increases in employment and a dramatic fall in 
unemployment. Between 1994 and 2000, the period covered by the 
present study, the total number at work increased by 450,000 or 37 
per cent: an exceptional rate of employment growth over a relatively 
short period. The increase in the number at work was almost the 
same for men and women but the female employment rate was 
lower to start with therefore the percentage increase is more 
dramatic for women. Labour force figures show that the 
employment rate for women rose from 40 per cent to 53 per cent 
between 1994 and 2000 (not shown). Over the same years, 
unemployment fell by 136,000, from almost 15 per cent of the 
labour force in 1994 to just over 4 per cent in 2000. The labour 
force participation rate increased from 53 per cent of the adult 
population in 1994 to 59 per cent in 2000. 
 
2.1  
Introduction 
2.2  
Labour Market 
and 
Demographic 
Trends 
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Table 2.1: Total At Work, Unemployed and Labour Force 1994-2000 
 At Work At Work 
M 
At Work 
F 
Unemp. Labour Force Unemploy-
ment Rate 
 (000s) (000s) (000s) (000s) (000s) % 
1994 1,221 761 453 211 1,432 14.7 
1996 1,329 815 513 179 1,508 11.9 
1998 1,495 900 595 127 1,622 7.8 
2000 1,671 990 681 75 1,746 4.3 
Change: 1994-2000 +450 +229 +228 -136 +314 -10.4 
% Change1994-
2000 
% 
+ 36.9 
% 
30.1 
% 
50.2 
% 
- 64.5 
% 
+ 21.9 
% 
-70.7 
Source: Labour Force Surveys and QNHS various years. 
 
We might expect such dramatic changes in employment and 
unemployment to have resulted in a shift in the distribution of 
employment across households between 1994 and 2000. In fact, 
about two-thirds of the increase in employment during this period 
took place between 1997 and 2000, as did over 60 per cent of the 
fall in the number unemployed, so shifts in household working 
patterns may be particularly concentrated in the more recent years.  
CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
In recent decades there have been a number of significant 
demographic changes which have important implications for the 
extent to which employment and joblessness are concentrated 
within households. The most influential of these changes is the 
growth of single adult households, comprising of those living alone 
and lone parent households, where one adult is co-resident with 
children. Single-adult households affect the distribution of work-rich 
and work-poor households because the employment status of that 
one person will place the household in either extreme of the 
continuum.  
 
Figure 2.1: Trends in Household Size, 1990-2001 (000s of persons) 
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Source: LFS various years. 
Figure 2.1 highlights the changes in household size over the last 
decade. There has been a gradual increase in the number of people 
living in one-person households from 229,000 in 1990 to 282,000 in 
2001. The number of people living in households of two to four 
people have also increased in that time period, whereas households 
with six or more people have declined. The graph includes 
households of all ages and a significant part of the increase in one 
person households has occurred among the over 65 age group who 
are not normally included in analyses of household worklessness. 
However, Census data show that among the 25-44 year old age-
group the number of one-person households doubled between 1981 
and 1996 (from 28,000 to 57,000). While among those aged 45 to 64 
years the number living alone increased by almost 17,000 (Census 96, 
Vol. 3, pp. 38,40; Census 81, Vol. 3, p. 20). We can also observe these 
changes by looking at the distribution of households.  
 
Figure 2.2: Trends in Household Size 1990-2001, (000s Households) 
Source: LFS, various years. 
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Figure 2.2 shows the trend in the number of households of 
different sizes in 1990, 1995 and 2001. Overall, the number of 
households in the state increased by about 27 per cent, from 
489,000 in 1990 to 620 in 2001. The rate of increase in the number 
of single-person households, up 23 per cent between 1990 and 2001, 
which mirrors the pattern for individuals in Figure 1, is slightly 
lower than the national average. The numbers of households with 2 
or 3 persons both increased by over 40 per cent during the period, 
while the number of households with 5 people remained virtually 
static. However, the number of households with 6 or more 
members fell by 35 per cent, from 23,000 in 1994 to 15,000 in 2001.  
The growth of lone parent households has proved significant for 
the incidence of joblessness in the UK (Gregg and Wadsworth, 
1996), because these households experience particular difficulties in 
combining their working and caring responsibilities and tend to 
experience other labour market disadvantages e.g. low educational 
qualifications (Fahey and Russell, 2001). Lone parenthood has also 
increased in Ireland from just under 40,000 families in 1989 to 
58,000 in 1997  when they accounted for 14 per cent of families 
with children, (Figure 2.3), which may have implications for rates of 
household work poverty here. 
 
Figure 2.3: Trends in Lone Parent Households 
9.1 8.9 9.8 10.3 10.7 10.6
11.7 12.6 13.7
0.0
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'000s % of families w ith kids<15
Source: Labour Force Surveys, various years (Fahey and Russell, 2001). 
Note: Lone parents with children under 15 years only. 
 
 In this study we draw on data from the Living in Ireland Surveys 
(LIS).4 The LIS consists of a household questionnaire which is 
completed by the ‘reference person’ or person responsible for the 
 
4 The LIS forms the Irish component of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP): an EU-wide project to conduct harmonised longitudinal surveys 
dealing with household income and labour situation in the member states.  
2.3  
Data and 
Measures 
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accommodation, and an individual questionnaire which is completed 
by each adult (aged 17 or over) in the household. The first wave of 
the LIS was conducted in 1994, and the same individuals and 
households were then followed each year until 2001. The data can 
therefore be used cross-sectionally for each year or can be used as a 
longitudinal panel. For Chapters 2 to 4 of the current study we rely 
on the cross-sectional data from 1994 and 2000, i.e. the first and the 
seventh wave of the survey. In Chapter 5 we make use of the 
longitudinal dimension of the survey, and draw on information from 
all seven surveys between 1994 and 2000. 
The total number of households successfully interviewed in 1994 
was 4,048, representing 57 per cent of the valid sample. Within these 
households, 9,904 eligible respondents completed the full individual 
questionnaire (964 on a proxy basis). In the following waves, despite 
extensive efforts to follow those moving or forming new 
households, the number of respondents declined as individuals 
moved, died or refused to participate. The response rates for each 
year of the survey are outlined in Table A2.1 in the Appendix to this 
chapter. Further details on sample attrition are outlined in Chapter 5 
and in Layte et al. (2001a). 
In 2000, the Irish sample of individuals and households followed 
from Wave 1 was supplemented by the addition of 1,500 new 
households to the total, to increase the overall sample size. The 
sample supplementation exercise, together with the follow-up of 
continuing households, resulted in a completed sample in 2000 of 
3,467 households. Individual interviews were conducted with 8,056 
respondents, representing 93 per cent of those eligible. In each 
survey, detailed information was provided on income, education, 
labour market experience and other characteristics.  
Our study is concerned with the working-age population, 
therefore, we have excluded households where the household 
reference person is aged 65 or over and couple-only households 
where either partner is aged 65 or over.5 A table outlining the sex of 
the household reference person in different household types is 
included in the Appendix of this chapter (Table A2.2).  
In Table 2.2 we present the distribution of household type in the 
1994 and 2000 LIS surveys. We distinguish households with adult 
children (aged 18-30) because this is relevant for the number of 
people in the household available for employment. We identify lone 
parents with children under 18 and lone parents with adult children. 
It should be noted that most definitions of lone parenthood would 
only include households that include children under 18 or 15 years 
(see Fahey and Russell, 2001).  
The sample figures have been weighted to the population totals. 
The total number of households in the State with members in the 
18-65 year age group increased by about 9 per cent over this seven-
year period. In general, the table shows substantial stability in 
 
5 The household reference person is defined as the owner or tenant of the 
accommodation, or if a couple are jointly responsible, the older of the two.  
   CHANGING HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS 13 
 
 
household composition, as might be expected over a relatively short 
period of time, in demographic terms. There were, however, a 
number of interesting shifts. The number of households in the 
modal category, composed of a couple with a youngest child under 
the age of 18, declined slightly in numerical terms, with the result 
that their share of total households fell from 48 per cent in 1994 to 
42 per cent in 2000. The number of households composed of a 
couple with adult children increased strongly, accounting for 8 per 
cent of all households in 1994 and over 9 per cent in 2000. 
Households headed by lone parents with children maintained their 
share of the total at about 10 per cent in both years. The greatest 
change occurred in the ‘other’ household category, mainly consisting 
of households of unrelated individuals, which increased from 50,000 
(6 per cent) in 1994 to 86,000 (9 per cent) in 2000.  
 
Table 2.2: The Distribution of Household Types, 1994 and 2000 
 1994  2000  
 (000s) % (000s) % 
1 person < 65 years 127.1 14.9 141.7 15.1 
Couple, both <65 years 82.1 9.6 104.9 11.2 
Couple, youngest child < 18 years 407.4 47.7 396.8 42.3 
Couple, adult children only 64.8 7.6 81.4 8.7 
Lone parent, youngest child < 18 years 65.3 7.6 69.5 7.4 
Lone parent adult children only 24.3 2.8 23.5 2.5 
Multi-generation, children < 30 years 33.6 3.9 35.1 3.7 
Other 49.7 5.8 86.4 9.2 
Total 854.3 100.0 939.3 100.0 
Source: Living in Ireland Surveys, 1994 and 2000. 
Note: Adult children are those aged 18-30 still living with their parent(s). 
The figures are weighted to represent the population. 
MEASURING WORK-RICH AND WORK-POOR 
HOUSEHOLDS 
A variety of measures have been used in the literature to explore 
whether there has been a polarisation in the employment patterns of 
households. Here we examine some of the most widely used 
measures. It is worth emphasising at this point that the measures are 
all limited to paid work and so should be more accurately labelled 
‘employment rich’ and ‘employment poor’ or ‘jobless’ households. 
The households we examine must also organise their unpaid work 
such as caring and domestic work, and these demands are likely to 
be one factor behind household employment outcomes. It should, 
therefore, be kept in mind that some households that are not 
defined as ‘work-rich’ may in fact be involved in high levels of 
unpaid work.  
The most commonly used and least complex measures of 
household employment are based on the number of adults of 
working age who are in employment at a particular point in time. In 
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its simplest form this cross-sectional information is then grouped 
into dichotomous categories of households where all adults are 
employed, labelled ‘work-rich’ and households where no adults is 
employed, labelled ‘workless’ (Cooper-Green, 2001). Households 
that do not fit into either category may or may not be included as a 
‘mixed-work’ category. Another alternative has been to calculate the 
proportion of adults in employment, which produces a continuum 
of work-rich work-poor households. In some cross-sectional 
analyses the relationship between household members is ignored. 
For example, a two-adult household may consist of a couple or a 
parent and adult child or two unrelated individuals (Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 1996). While other research focuses on families within 
households and in particular on the employment patterns of couples 
(Brannen and Moss 1998; Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001). 
The advantage of this approach is that the measure is easily 
comparable over time and across groups. For example, the UK 
Office for National Statistics uses this dichotomous definition, to 
compare the ratio of work-rich to workless households between 
1996 and 2001 and across different regions, ethnic groups and 
household types (Cooper-Green, 2001). One disadvantage of this 
definition is that it does not take into account the hours that people 
work, so that a household with two adults working full-time is 
placed in the same category as a household with two people working 
part-time.  
The hours worked by household members are interesting from a 
poverty perspective, in that households that are not workless but 
have only a small number of paid hours are likely to be more 
vulnerable to poverty. Investigating the hours of paid work can also 
contribute to the debate about the polarisation of working time and 
the impact this might have on the quality of family and community 
life (Brannen and Moss, 1998).  
In this study we adopt two measures of the household work 
situation. The first considers the employment status of all adults of 
working age in the household (18-64 years). Those doing any paid 
work are counted as employed, including those working less than 15 
hours per week. Households are then grouped into three categories 
work-rich (all employed), mixed-work, (some members employed 
others not) and work-poor (no-one in employment). To take 
account of variation due to working hours we will construct a 
second measure of household employment which calculates the 
mean number of working hours per week for household members 
of working age. 
 
 Figure 2.4, drawing on data from the Labour Force Survey and the 
Quarterly National Household Survey, allows us to look at the 
evolution in the distribution of employment across all households 
from 1989 to 2000. The share of workless households increased 
somewhat from 32 per cent of all households in 1989 to just under 
35 per cent in 1994 and 1995, but dropped steadily thereafter, to 
about 27 per cent in 2000. The share of households with one person 
2.4  
Trends in 
Household 
Joblessness 
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in paid employment dropped steadily, from 42 per cent of all 
households in 1989 to 32 per cent in 1997 and to about 27 per cent 
in 2000. In contrast, the share of households with 2 or more 
members at work increased steadily from 25 per cent in 1989 to 32 
per cent in 1997, and then increased more rapidly to just over 40 per 
cent in 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Number Employed per Household by Household Size, 
1989-2000  
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 Source: Labour Force Survey and Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
 
The data in Figure 2.4 are useful insofar as they track broad 
trends in the number employed per household for all households 
over the 1989-2000 period, but they are not disaggregated by 
household type, nor do they focus on the population of working 
age. We expect that the majority of those over 65 years of age are in 
retirement and there are particular policy concerns with the 
distribution of employment among those of working age. In order 
to focus exclusively on the population of working age, we must turn 
to the Living in Ireland Survey (LIS). For the remainder of this 
chapter we focus on households with members in the working-age 
population, aged 18-64 years, since this is the population of primary 
interest in a study of household employment patterns.  
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Table 2.3: Household Employment Status, 1994 and 2000 
Household 
Employment Status 
1994 1997 2000 
 % % % 
No Work 22.1 17.6 13.6 
Mixed-work 42.9 46.1 37.1 
All Work 34.9 36.4 49.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Living in Ireland Surveys. 
 
Table 2.3 shows household employment status for all households 
where the household reference person is aged 18-64 years for the 
years 1994, 1997 and 2000.6 The proportion of households in which 
no member was engaged in paid employment fell from 22 per cent 
in 1994 to 18 per cent in 1997 and less than 14 per cent in 2000. The 
rate of household worklessness in 1994 is consistent with the 
international comparisons shown in Chapter 1, which reveal a very 
high incidence of workless households in Ireland. However, there 
was a very sharp fall in the incidence of workless households after 
1994, down to 14 per cent in the year 2000.  
The decline in the incidence of workless households was offset 
by modest increases in the proportions of households in the mixed-
work and all work categories between 1994 and 1997. However, 
between 1997 and 2000 the proportion of households in which all 
adults were in paid employment increased sharply, from 36 per cent 
in 1997 to 49 per cent in 2000. The proportion of households in 
which some, but not all adults were at work declined from 46 per 
cent in 1997 to 37 per cent in 2000. So the expansion in 
employment opportunities in the later years of the 1990s led to a 
very substantial increase in work-rich households, a continuation of 
the decline in workless households, which had begun in 1994, as 
well as some reduction in the proportion of households with a 
mixed-work pattern. 
These trends over time are consistent with trends in individual 
employment and unemployment over the period. As shown in Table 
2.1, total employment increased by 37 per cent between 1994 and 
2000, while the number unemployed fell by 65 per cent. However, 
about two-thirds of the increase in employment during the period 
took place between 1997 and 2000, as did over 60 per cent of the 
fall in the number unemployed, so we would expect shifts in 
household working patterns to be particularly concentrated in the 
more recent years.  
Table 2.4: Household Type by Household Employment Status, 1994 and 2000 
  1994   2000  
 No 
Work 
Mixed-
Work 
All Work No Work Mixed-
Work 
All Work 
 
6 Households with a member aged 65 or over who is not the household reference 
person will still be included e.g. three generation households. However, the 
employment status of the person aged over 65 is not be used to construct the 
household status. 
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 % % % % % % 
1 person < 65 years 37.1 – 62.9 28.1 – 71.9 
Couple, both <65 years 16.4 29.4 54.2 11.8 20.9 67.4 
Couple, youngest child < 18 years 14.1 57.1 28.7 4.4 46.8 48.8 
Couple, children 18-29 years 8.7 77.1 14.1 7.8 71.5 20.7 
Lone parent, child <18 years 70.1 8.1 21.8 41.1 10.6 48.3 
Lone parent, children 18-29 years 23.5 57.6 18.9 15.9 58.7 25.4 
Multi-generation, children < 30 years 15.4 71.3 13.4 8.1 73.0 18.9 
Other 17.5 33.4 49.2 19.3 41.0 39.7 
Total 22.1 42.9 34.9 13.6 37.1 49.3 
Source: Living in Ireland Surveys.  
 
Given that the distribution of employment is strongly influenced 
by household size and structure, it is useful to examine trends over 
time by household type. Table 2.4 shows the pattern for different 
household types and suggests that most household types shared in 
the general trend of a decline in worklessness and an increase in the 
proportion of work-rich households. For example, among 
households composed of single individuals under the age of 65, 37 
per cent were workless in 1994, while 63 per cent of the individuals 
were at work. In 2000 the proportion not at work had fallen to 28 
per cent while the proportion at work had increased to 72 per cent.  
There were a number of household types in which there was a 
marked decline in worklessness. In households composed of 
couples in which the youngest child is less than 18 years of age, 
traditional nuclear-families, the rate of worklessness fell from 14 per 
cent in 1994 to 4 per cent in 2000. There was also a decline in 
worklessness in households headed by lone parents. In lone-parent 
headed households where the youngest child was aged less than 18 
years, the proportion with no adult working fell dramatically from 
70 per cent in 1994 to 41 per cent in 2000. In lone-parent 
households with adult children, the proportion with no working 
adult fell from 24 per cent to 16 per cent.  
The decline in joblessness among the two household categories 
with children under 18 years has had significant implications for the 
proportion of children living in households where no-one is in 
employment, which declined dramatically from 27 per cent in 1994 
to 9 per cent in 2000.  
These declines in the proportion of jobless households were 
accompanied by increases in the proportion of work-rich 
households. The proportion of nuclear-family type households 
(couple plus children aged under 18) with all adults working 
increased from 29 per cent in 1994 to 49 per cent in 2000. This 
result suggests there has been a substantial shift towards dual-
earning among this group. This shift from single to dual-earner has 
been witnessed right across the EU and the US, but usually over a 
longer time-frame (OECD, 1988; Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001; Han 
and Moen, 2001). The increase in the case of lone-parent headed 
households with children aged under 18 years was from 22 per cent 
to 48 per cent. The principal exception to this general trend 
occurred among households in the ‘other’ category, mainly 
households of unrelated individuals, where the proportion workless 
increased from 18 per cent in 1994 to 19 per cent in 2000. 
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Table 2.5 shows the risk of household worklessness by the 
educational attainment of the household reference person and 
household type in 1994 and 2000. In general, there is a strong 
relationship between the educational qualifications of the household 
reference person and the rate of worklessness. In 1994, there was no 
adult at work in 38 per cent of households headed by individuals 
with no qualifications, indicating a very high risk of worklessness at 
this education level, compared to less than 5 per cent of households 
in which the household reference person had attended third level 
education. In 2000, the corresponding rates of worklessness were 29 
per cent in respect of households headed by those with no 
qualifications, compared to 4 per cent of those in which the 
reference person had attended third level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5: Risk of Household Worklessness by Educational Attainment of Household 
Reference Person 
 
No 
Qualifications 
Junior 
Cert. 
Leaving 
Cert. 
Third 
Level All 
1994      
1 person <65 years 64.8 43.9 16.4 10.5 36.7 
Couple, both <65 years 35.7 6.8 14.0 2.3 16.1 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 28.0 9.8 6.1 1.9 13.8 
Couple, adult children 18-29 years  12.1 12.0 1.1 1.5 8.7 
Lone parent, youngest child <18 years 75.6 68.6 63.1 36.8 70.0 
Lone parent, adult children 18-29 years 34.9 3.2 15.6 0.0 23.9 
Multi-generation, children <30 years 21.8 12.4 0.0 0.0 15.4 
Other 32.9 14.2 9.2 2.4 17.5 
All 37.6 17.4 12.4 4.7 21.9 
2000      
1 person <65 years 50.4 33.7 22.8 5.0 28.1 
Couple, both <65 years 38.8 11.0 7.1 2.2 11.8 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 12.0 5.8 0.6 1.0 4.4 
Couple, adult children 18-29 9.9 1.4 11.0 9.9 7.8 
Lone parent, youngest child <18 years 56.8 40.6 43.5 22.7 41.1 
Lone parent, adult children 18-29 years 23.2 21.0 0.0 6.4 15.9 
Multi-generation, children <30 years 15.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 8.1 
Other 51.2 15.8 12.3 1.9 19.3 
All 29.0 12.5 9.7 3.9 13.6 
Source: Living in Ireland Surveys. 
 
In general, this strong relationship between education and 
worklessness is repeated within each household type. For example, 
in 1994, among single-person households, 65 per cent of those with 
no qualifications were workless, 44 per cent of those with a Junior 
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Certificate level of education were workless, as were 16 per cent of 
those with a Leaving Certificate. Among single person households 
with third level education, 11 per cent were workless. In the same 
year, among households composed of couples with children aged 
less than 18 years, the risk of worklessness fell from 28 per cent 
among those with no qualifications, to 2 per cent among those with 
third level qualifications. In 1994, households headed by a lone 
parent with children under the age of 18 years, the household type 
with the highest overall risk of worklessness, fully three-quarters of 
those with no qualifications had no one at work. In this household 
type, almost 70 per cent of those with a Junior Certificate level of 
education were workless, as were 63 per cent of those with a 
Leaving Certificate. Even among such lone-parent households in 
which the household head had a third level qualification, the risk of 
worklessness was 37 per cent, almost as high as the national average 
for all households in which the household reference person had no 
qualifications.  
Overall, the incidence of workless households fell at each level of 
educational attainment in most household types in the period 1994 
to 2000. However, there were some exceptions to this pattern. For 
example, among households composed of a couple with adult 
children, the risk of worklessness actually increased where the 
household reference person had a Leaving Certificate or third level 
education and among ‘other’ households, the risk of worklessness 
increased in each educational category except where the reference 
person had attended third level education.  
Conversely, it is also worth noting that the incidence of work-
rich households is strongly related to education. Only 27 per cent of 
households headed by someone with no qualifications are work-rich 
compared to 69 per cent of those headed by a third level graduate 
(table not shown). If we consider couples with young children (<18 
years) and couples with no children we see that dual-earner couples 
are much more common among those with high education (Table 
2.6).7 This is consistent with international research on couples’ work 
patterns. Greater earning capacity and raised career aspirations 
among educated women increase the likelihood that they will remain 
in employment when they have children. 
Table 2.6: Proportion of Work-Rich Among Couple Households by Education of 
Reference Person, 2000 
 No Qualifications 
Junior 
Cert. 
Leaving 
Cert. 
Third 
Level All 
Couple, both under 65 years 27.2 64.9 72.7 86.2 67.4 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 23.2 51.3 49.0 64.6 48.8 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 2000. 
 
 
 
7 The situation for couples with adult children is less clear because the status of 
these older children will influence the household work situation. 
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Table 2.7 shows the risk of household worklessness by age group 
of the household reference person. Overall, households where the 
reference person was in the 55-64 year age group were at the 
greatest risk of worklessness: 31 per cent in 1994, 26 per cent in 
2000. However, this generalisation conceals important differences 
between household types. In general, in households without 
children the rate of worklessness increases with age. For example, in 
1994, 18 per cent of single person households headed by someone 
aged less than 35 years were workless, compared to 68 per cent of 
those aged 55 to 64 years. Among households with children, 
however, the reverse appears to hold: in 1994, 19 per cent of 
households composed of couples with younger children with a 
reference person in the under 35 year age were workless, compared 
to 11 per cent of similar households in the 55-64 year age group.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.7: Risk of Household Worklessness by Age Group of Household Reference Person 
 
Less than 35 
Years 35-44 Years 45-54 Years 55-64 Years All 
1994      
1 person < 65 years 18.1 24.3 35.4 67.7 37.1 
Couple, both < 65 years 0.0 8.7 14.0 38.7 16.4 
Couple, youngest child < 18 years 18.9 14.1 10.6 10.7 14.1 
Couple, adult children 18-29 years 0.0 0.0 9.3 9.2 8.7 
Lone parent, youngest child <18 years 81.4 68.8 55.2 45.7 70.1 
Lone parent, adult children 18-29 years 0.0 64.8 5.8 27.9 23.5 
Multi-generation, children < 30 years 26.9 18.0 11.2 15.3 15.4 
Other 7.1 18.4 23.1 26.7 17.5 
All 23.3 19.5 16.8 31.2 22.1 
2000      
1 person <65 years 8.8 13.6 34.8 55.5 28.1 
Couple, both < 65 years 3.3 0.0 4.4 32.9 11.8 
Couple, youngest child < 18 years 4.3 3.4 5.8 5.0 4.4 
Couple, adult children 18-29 years 0.0 0.0 3.6 10.7 7.8 
Lone parent, youngest child <18 years 46.0 37.0 38.5 19.1 41.1 
Lone parent, adult children 18-29 years 0.0 0.0 14.9 17.4 15.9 
Multi-generation, children < 30 years 3.9 2.7 5.8 12.1 8.1 
Other 3.4 11.1 60.2 33.8 19.3 
All 11.3 6.7 13.5 25.5 13.6 
Source: Living in Ireland Surveys. 
 
The improvement in the labour market between 1994 and 2000 
led to a reduction in worklessness in all age categories (comparing 
the bottom row for each year in Table 2.7). However, the new 
opportunities appear to have been disproportionately taken up by 
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younger households. Among households where the reference 
person was aged less than 45 years, the risk of worklessness fell by 
more than half between 1994 and 2000, while among older 
households, the risk of worklessness fell only by about one-fifth. 
Table 2.8 shows the distribution of employment between 
households by urban/rural residence. In 1994, 25 per cent of 
households in urban areas were workless, compared to 17 per cent 
in rural areas, suggesting a higher concentration of disadvantage in 
urban areas. Rural households were more likely to be characterised 
by the mixed-work pattern and there was virtually no difference 
between urban and rural households in the proportion of 
households in which all adults were employed. By 2000, however, 
the differences in worklessness had virtually disappeared, although 
the proportion of urban households with all adults in paid work was 
higher (51 per cent) than in rural areas (46 per cent), perhaps 
reflecting a disproportionate improvement in labour market 
opportunities in urban areas in the second half of the 1990s. 
Alternatively, this may reflect a greater adherence to the traditional 
male breadwinner household model in rural areas. 
Table 2.8: Household Employment Status by Urban/Rural 
Residence 
 1994  2000  
 Rural Urban Rural Urban 
No work 17.2 25.1 13.2 13.9 
Mixed-work 47.3 40.3 40.6 34.8 
All work 35.4 34.6 46.2 51.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Living in Ireland Surveys. 
 
Table 2.9 presents a simple logistic regression analysis of the 
probability of a household having no one in paid employment, 
versus having some or all adults in employment. The predictor 
variables are the risk factors already explored in a bivariate manner 
in Tables 2.3 to 2.8 above. The regression allows us to examine the 
effects of each variable while controlling for the influence of the 
others, and we are particularly interested in changes in the effects of 
the variables over time.  
With regard to household type, we see considerable stability in 
the overall pattern of effects over time (indicated by the signs of the 
coefficients), but also some shifts in the influence of different 
household types (indicated by the magnitude of the coefficients). In 
1994 lone parent households with younger children faced the 
highest risk of worklessness, substantially higher than the reference 
category, couple households, but, as Table 2.3 suggests the risk for 
these lone parent households, relative to that for the reference 
category, declined over time. Among one-person households, the 
risk of worklessness was significantly greater than among couple 
households in 1994, and their relative risk increased somewhat in 
2000. In contrast, couples with adult children were substantially less 
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likely to experience worklessness in 1994, and their risk declined, 
relative to that of couple households in 2000. A similar pattern can 
be observed in relation to households composed of couples with 
younger children.  
In both years, the educational attainment of the household 
reference person was highly influential: the higher the education of 
the household reference person, the lower the probability that no 
adults were at work. The reduction in probability of joblessness 
associated with third level and upper second level qualifications was 
similar in both years. However, the difference between those with 
Junior Certificate level qualifications and no qualifications declined 
over the period. 
 
 
 
Table 2.9: Logistic Regression of Workless Households, 1994 and 2000 
  1994   2000  
 Coefficient S.E. Error Coefficient S.E. Error 
Household type:      
Ref cat.: Couple, no children     
1 person 1.008 *** .220 1.226 *** .260 
Couple, youngest child < 18 years -.502 * .193 -1.103 *** .266 
Couple with adult children  -1.524 *** .283 -1.978 *** .386 
Lone parent, youngest child18 
years  
1.962 *** .258 1.149 ** .308 
Lone parent, adult children -.278  .329 -.690  .462 
Multi-generation, children <30 years -.782 * .310 -1.300 * .450 
Other 0.014  .268 .240  .295 
Education:      
Ref Cat: No Qualifications      
Junior Cert. Level Certificate -1.068 *** .153 -.665 ** .191 
Leaving Certificate -1.340 *** .164 -1.406 *** .230 
Third Level -2.602 *** .280 -2.130 *** .293 
Age-group:      
Ref Cat:. < 35 years      
35-44 years -.168  .165 .083  .263 
45-54 years -.820 *** .185 .120  .256 
55-64 years .201  .180 .614 * .258 
Urban residence .787 *** .120 .501 ** .156 
Constant -2.665 *** .262 -3.624 *** .321 
 
 
N of cases 
 
 
3,111   
 
 
2,413   
-2 Log Likelihood (initial) 2,624.36   1,598.09   
-2 Log Likelihood (final) 2,105.07   1,242.41   
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Nagelkerke R2 .27   .28   
*, p < .05; **, p < .001; ***, p < .0001  
 
 
The effects of age are less clear. In 1994, households with a 
reference person in the 45-54 year age group were less likely than 
those with a reference person aged less than 35 years to experience 
worklessness. In 2000, households with older reference persons 
were more likely to be workless. Urban households were more likely 
to be workless in both years, but the magnitude of this effect fell 
over time. 
 
 Up to this point we have focused on patterns of household 
employment based on whether individual household members are 
employed or not. However, we noted at the outset of this chapter 
that this does not take account of variation in the hours that people 
work, so that a household with two adults working full-time is 
regarded as equivalent to a household with two adults working 10 
hours per week. The hours worked by household members can 
strongly influence households’ welfare and dependence on social 
welfare income. An examination of changes in working hours also 
allows us to establish whether some households are experiencing 
very long hours in paid work. The polarisation hypothesis suggests 
that the number of households experiencing long work hours has 
increased (Brannen and Moss, 1998). Furthermore long hours of 
paid work within households is also mentioned as a potentially 
negative influence on the quality of family life (especially among 
families with young children).  
The measure of household hours is calculated by adding together 
the hours of paid work for each household member of working age 
(18-64 years), this total is then divided by the number of members 
of working age. For example, if there are three adults one working 
40 hours per week, one working zero hours and one working 20 
hours, the household average will be 20 hours (60/3). 
Table 2.10: Average Hours Worked per Adult Per Week  
 1994 2000 
Hours % % 
Less than 10 33.1 20.5 
10 to 19 16.9 14.7 
20 to 29 19.8 24.7 
30 to 39  16.9 24.0 
40 to 44 4.6 7.5 
45 or more 8.7 8.6 
All 100.0 100.0 
Note: Excludes households with missing information on hours of work. 
 
Table 2.10 shows the distribution of mean working hours for 
households. In 1994, in a third of all households the average 
2.5  
Working Hours 
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working time per adult household member was less than 10 hours 
per week. This fell to 21 per cent of households in 2000. So by this 
measure, the proportion of work-poor households fell over the 
period, mirroring the decline in worklessness based on the 
dichotomous measure of employment (see Table 2.3). Adding 
households with very low average working hours to the work-poor 
category increases the rate of work poverty by 11 percentage points 
in 1994 and 7 percentage points in 2000. This suggests an additional 
category where the level of paid work may not be enough to sustain 
the household on market earnings alone, but which has also 
declined over the time period.  
The proportion working an average of 10 to 19 hours also 
decreased but each of the other categories of average working time 
increased. For example, in 1994 17 per cent of households had an 
average working time of 30-40 hours per adult per week, and this 
increased to 24 per cent in 2000. There was an increase in the 
proportion of households working 40 to 44 hours on average per 
adult but the proportion of households in the highest category, 
where the average was 45 hours or more per week was stable. This 
suggests some expansion in the proportion of households working 
long hours but not in the most extreme category.  
The work-life balance debate suggests that the implications of 
high working hours will vary depending on households position in 
the life cycle. Table 2.11 shows how changes in working hours are 
distributed by household type. There is substantial variation in 
average household working hours across the different household 
types. In 1994 in 24 per cent of households consisting of a couple 
with adult children, the average working time was less than 10 hours 
per adult, compared to 76 per cent of households headed by a lone 
parent with young children. Between 1994 and 2000, there was a 
marked decline in the share of households working less than 10 
hours per adult in all household types except ‘other’, and a 
corresponding increase in the share of households working longer 
hours, particularly in those working 30 or more hours per adult per 
week. 
Table 2.11: Household Type by Average Hours Worked per Adult per Week 
   Hours    
 0 to 10 10 to 19 20 to 29 30 to 39 40+ Total 
1994 % % % % % % 
One person <65 years 42.6 0.8 4.1 24.0 28.5 100.0 
Couple, both <65 years 22.7 12.8 16.3 19.3 28.9 100.0 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 24.2 22.0 29.0 17.3 7.6 100.0 
Couple, adult children (18-29) years 23.7 34.5 27.4 12.0 2.4 100.0 
Lone parent, youngest child<18 years 75.7 6.5 3.6 9.7 4.5 100.0 
Lone parent, adult children  36.8 23.7 24.4 8.9 6.1 100.0 
Multi-generation, children <30 years 31.4 34.7 26.7 6.7 0.6 100.0 
Other 30.1 14.1 12.6 16.9 26.3 100.0 
All 33.1 16.9 19.8 16.9 13.3 100.0 
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2000       
One person <65 years 33.9 2.6 12.9 20.7 29.9 100.0 
Couple, both <65 years 16.6 8.3 14.7 38.9 21.5 100.0 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 7.7 18.3 32.8 26.3 15.0 100.0 
Couple, adult children (18-29) years 17.8 27.5 35.0 16.8 2.9 100.0 
Lone parent, youngest child<18 years 44.5 9.1 17.2 17.1 12.1 100.0 
Lone parent, adult children  19.6 22.9 39.5 16.5 1.6 100.0 
Multi-generation, children <30 years 13.8 36.8 31.7 14.3 3.4 100.0 
Other 35.3 15.1 16.7 20.9 12.0 100.0 
All 20.5 14.7 24.7 24.0 16.1 100.0 
 
The most dramatic decline in the proportion of households 
working less than 10 hours per adult occurred in respect of 
households headed by lone parents with young children, down from 
76 per cent in 1994 to 47 per cent in 2000. The proportion of these 
households working 10 to 30 hours per week increased from 11 per 
cent in 1994 to 26 per cent in 2000, and the share working more 
than 30 hours per adult increased from 14 per cent in 1994 to 29 per 
cent in 2000. Some of this increase in working hours among 
households headed by lone-parents may be due to strong growth in 
the number of lone-parents participating in the Community 
Employment Scheme after 1994 (Deloitte and Touche and Murphy, 
1998). The Community Employment Scheme provides part-time 
work opportunities, mainly in the community and voluntary sector, 
to the long-term unemployed and others suffering labour market 
disadvantage. However, the growth in working hours above 20 
hours per week would suggest that lone parents also took increasing 
advantage of opportunities in the open labour market over this 
period. 
Focusing on the top end of the hours spectrum, we see that the 
biggest increase in high average working hours (i.e., 40 hours or 
more) has occurred among households composed of couples with 
children under the age of 18, and lone parents with young children. 
These households have also experienced an increase in the 
proportion where the average number of paid hours is between 30 
and 40 per week. Since households with children tend to also have a 
high unpaid work-load due to domestic and caring commitments 
this suggests that some of this group may consider themselves over-
worked rather than work-rich. 
COMBINING FULL- AND PART-TIME WORKING 
In the context of a focus on working hours, it is also useful to 
examine the manner in which households combine full- and part-
time working. Table 2.12 shows the distribution of households by 
the number of full- and part-time workers. Individuals working 30 
hours per week are regarded as full-timers; those working less than 
30 hours are considered to be part-timers. There was an increase in 
the proportion of individuals working part-time in the national 
labour market between 1994 and 2000, so we would expect this 
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increase to be reflected in households. The proportion of 
households in which there was a single individual working part-time, 
and no others gainfully employed increased from just under 7 per 
cent to just under 9 per cent. The proportion of households with 
one full-time and one part-time worker also increased, from 10 per 
cent in 1994 to 14 per cent in 2000. There was a substantial 
reduction in the share of households with a single full-time worker, 
down from 53 per cent in 1994 to 38 per cent in 2000. This was 
partly offset by an increase in households with two full-time 
workers; up from 21 per cent to 27 per cent. The proportion of 
households in the other category, mainly where there were more 
than 2 persons at work also increased from 9 per cent to almost 12 
per cent. The general trend entails an increase in the proportion of 
households with multiple earners and a decline in the proportion 
with only one person in paid employment.  
Table 2.12: Distribution of Households by Number of Part- and Full-
Time Workers, Households in which at least One Adult is 
in Employment 
 1994 2000 
1 part-time only 6.7 8.8 
1 full-time only 52.9 38.3 
1 full-time and 1 part-time 10.2 14.2 
2 full-time 20.7 26.9 
Other (more than 2 at work) 9.4 11.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Note: Excludes households with missing information on hours worked by 
household members. 
  
Table 2.13: Distribution of Households by Part- and Full-Time Workers in Couple Household, 
Households in which at least One Adult is in Employment 
 1 part-time 1 full-time 
1 full-time, 
1 part-time 2 full-time Other Total 
1994 % % % % % % 
Couple 4.4 31.5 8.5 54.2 1.3 100.0 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 5.8 52.5 14.5 18.6 8.8 100.0 
Couple, adult children 18-29 years 4.7 29.9 12.2 24.4 28.7 100.0 
2000       
Couple 1.5 21.2 9.5 67.8 0.0 100.0 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 2.5 38.0 19.1 28.1 12.3 100.0 
Couple, adult children 18-29 years 1.7 17.2 16.5 27.2 37.4 100.0 
Note: Excludes households with missing information on hours worked by household members. 
 
Table 2.13 shows full- and part-time working combinations for 
couple households. In both years couples with a single part-time 
worker represented a small minority of all households, and such 
households declined in importance over time. The share of couple 
households in which a single adult was in paid employment also 
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declined. For example, the share of households composed of a 
couple with a youngest child under the age of 18 years, traditional 
nuclear families, with one person in full-time employment fell from 
53 per cent in 1994 to 38 per cent in 2000. These shifts were offset 
by increases in the share of households with dual earners. The 
proportion of nuclear families combining one full-time with one 
part-time worker increased from 15 per cent in 1994 to 19 per cent 
in 2000, while the share of such households with two full-time 
workers increased from 19 per cent to 28 per cent. Among 
households composed of couples with adult children, the 
proportion in the ‘other category’ – all multiple earners and mainly 
involving 3 or more workers – increased from 29 per cent in 1994 to 
37 per cent in 2000. So couple households participated strongly in 
this general trend towards increased involvement in paid work.  
 
 This chapter has focused on trends over time in the distribution 
of paid work across households and examined differences in the risk 
of worklessness both between different households and over time. 
Rapid economic growth during the 1990s resulted in unprecedented 
employment growth and a dramatic fall in unemployment. Under 
these highly favourable conditions, the proportion of households 
with adult members of working age (18-65 years) in which no one 
was in paid employment declined markedly, from 22 per cent in 
1994, to 18 per cent in 1997 and less than 14 per cent in 2000. The 
rate of household worklessness observed in 1994 is consistent with 
international comparisons in Chapter 1 which show a very high 
incidence of workless households in Ireland. However, the 
subsequent fall in the incidence of workless households – by 8 
percentage points between 1994 and 2000 – was sufficient to bring 
the household workless rate in Ireland below the European average. 
The decline in the proportion of workless households was offset by 
an increase in the proportion of households in which some but not 
all households worked between 1994 and 1997, and by a marked 
increase in the proportion of work-rich households between 1997 
and 2000, the latter period being one of a particularly dramatic 
increase in total employment in the economy. Therefore, the Irish 
situation is unlike that in the UK, where there was an increase in the 
proportion of households at the two extremes (up to 1996), giving 
rise to the polarisation debate. Ireland saw the same rise in work-
rich households but also experienced a dramatic decline in work-
poverty. 
Most household types shared in the general trend of a decline in 
worklessness and an increase in the proportion of work-rich 
households between 1994 and 2000. There were a number of 
household types in which there was a marked decline in 
worklessness. In households composed of couples in which the 
youngest child is less than 18 years of age, traditional nuclear-
families, the rate of worklessness fell from 14 per cent in 1994 to 4 
per cent in 2000. There was also a sharp decline in worklessness in 
households headed by lone parents. The principal exception to this 
2.6 
Conclusion 
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general trend occurred among households in the ‘other’ category, 
mainly households of unrelated individuals, where the proportion of 
workless households increased somewhat between 1994 and 2000. 
There is no evidence that changes in household composition 
blocked the decline in work poverty, as experienced in the UK 
(Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996). Although there has been an increase 
in lone parent households and single person households who are 
more prone to household work poverty, their decreased risk of 
worklessness has been sufficient to counteract any negative 
compositional effect.  
In general, there is a strong relationship between the educational 
qualifications of the household reference person and the rate of 
worklessness of the household. In 1994, households in which the 
reference person had no qualifications were eight times more likely 
to be jobless than households in which the household reference 
person had attended third level education. In 2000, the risk of 
household worklessness was still 7.4 times greater among the former 
group than the latter.  
Overall, older households were at greater risk of worklessness, 
although there were important differences between household types. 
In households without children the rate of worklessness tended to 
increase with the age of the household reference person. Among 
households with children, however, the reverse appears to hold, so 
that households with reference persons in the younger age groups 
were more likely to be workless. The improvement in the labour 
market between 1994 and 2000 led to a reduction in worklessness in 
all age categories. However, the new opportunities appear to have 
been disproportionately taken up by younger households. 
In 1994 urban households were at greater risk of being workless 
than rural households, suggesting a greater concentration of 
disadvantage in urban areas. By 2000, the raw data suggest that 
urban-rural differences in worklessness had virtually disappeared. 
However, when other factors were controlled including household 
composition we found that urban residents still had a higher risk of 
being work-poor.  
While the overall incidence of workless households decreased 
over time, multivariate analysis of the risk factors associated with 
workless households indicates substantial stability in the relative 
risks of experiencing worklessness between 1994 and 2000. 
Nonetheless, there were some shifts in the risks experienced by 
different household types: the risk of worklessness declined for both 
couple and single-parent households with younger children. The 
educational attainment of the household reference person had 
strong effects on the probability that a household would be workless 
in both years, however the difference in risk between those with 
Junior Certificate level education and those with no qualifications 
declined. We also found that the negative effect of urban residence 
declined somewhat over time. 
Shifting the focus to work-rich households reveals another 
interesting trend. The biggest increase in work-rich households 
occurred among couples with children under 18 years and lone 
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parents with children under 18. This result suggests that this change 
is strongly influenced by changes in female employment. This 
conclusion is also suggested by labour market statistics which show 
that women account for a major part of the growth in employment 
in the second half of the 1990s (Russell et al., 2002; O’Connell, 
2000). This issue is returned to in Chapter 5. 
The analyses presented in this chapter focused mainly on 
patterns of household employment based on whether individuals 
household members were employed or not. We also briefly 
examined trends in the distribution of working hours across 
households, on the grounds that the hours worked by household 
members can strongly influence households’ living standards and 
dependence on social welfare income. We found that the proportion 
of households in which the average working time per adult per week 
was less than 10 hours per week fell from 33 per cent of all 
households in 1994 to 21 per cent in 2000. So by this measure, the 
proportion of ‘work-poor’ households fell over the period, 
mirroring the decline in worklessness based on the dichotomous 
measure of employment. We also found that the proportion of 
households with a single earner in either full- or part-time 
employment declined, while the proportion of households with 
multiple earners, including both all full-time workers as well as 
combinations of full- and part-time, increased.  
There was a small increase in the proportion with high average 
working times of 40 hours or more, but the biggest increase was in 
the 30-40 hours category. This suggests a growing number of 
households where all adults are working full-time but not a 
concentration of very long hours within households. There is also 
evidence of increasing hours of paid work in households with 
children under 18 years, which points to potential time-poverty 
among some of this group when unpaid work is considered, 
however the current data cannot confirm this.  
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APPENDIX TABLES: 
CHAPTER 2 
Table A2.1: Household and Individual Response Details, Living in Ireland Surveys 1994 -2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Cont. 
2000 
New 
Total 
2000 
Households          
Completed Households 4,048 3,584 3,174 2,945 2,729 2,378 1,952 1,515 3,467 
Non-Response 3,038 794 624 390 394 464 414 1,146 1,560 
Total Households 7,086 4,378 3,798 3,335 3,123 2,842 2,366 2,661 5,027 
Household Response Rate 57% 82% 84% 88% 87% 84% 83% 57% 69% 
          
Individuals          
N. in Completed Households: 14,585 12,576 10,889 9,952 9,000 7,721 6,276 5,174 11,450 
Eligible for Interview* 10,418 9,048 7,902 7,255 6,620 5,719 4,745 3,952 8,697 
Interviewed 9,904 8,531 7,488 6,868 6,324 5,451 4,529 3,527 8,056 
% Completed  95% 94% 95% 95% 96% 95% 95% 89% 93% 
* Aged 17 and over. 
 
Table A2.2: Sex of Household Reference Person by Household Type 
 Male Female Total 
    
One person <65 years 56.2 43.8 100 
Couple, both under 65 years 78.0 22.0 100 
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Couple, youngest child <18 years 82.3 17.7 100 
Couple with adult children only (18-29 years)  85.9 14.1 100 
Lone parent, youngest kid<18 years 7.6 92.4 100 
Lone parent, adult children (18-29 years)  26.2 73.8 100 
Multi-generation hhs, children under 30 years 63.4 36.6 100 
Other 49.8 50.2 100 
All 66.4 33.6 100 
32 
3. COMPOSITION AND 
INCOME OF JOBLESS 
HOUSEHOLDS 
In the last chapter we examined the overall pattern in the 
distribution of work across households as well as the risk factors 
associated with worklessness. In this chapter we focus on the 
composition of workless households in order to examine which 
types of households are affected by worklessness, and to shed light 
on why some households have not become integrated into the 
labour market despite the employment growth described in the last 
chapter. We then turn to an analysis of the income situation of 
households in different employment situations. We consider 
changes in the real level of income of households with different 
attachments to the labour market, and the position of work-poor 
households in the national income distribution. This allows us to 
investigate whether there has been a polarisation in the conditions of 
those experiencing household joblessness. We then go on to 
compare the income packages of work-poor, mixed-work and work-
rich households, that is the proportion of income coming from 
different sources for example the market, the state and private 
incomes. In the final section we break down in more detail the types 
of welfare income received by work-poor households, this provides 
some insight into the policy issues relevant to work-poor 
households in 2000.  
 
 Table 3.1 shows household employment status by household type 
for households with working age members. In 1994, about 30 per 
cent of workless households were composed of couples with 
children, the youngest less than 18 years, traditional nuclear families, 
and the most common household type in Irish society (see Table 
2.2). Another 24 per cent of workless households were headed by 
lone parents with children under the age of 18. Therefore, well over 
half of all workless households had children under the age of 18. A 
further 25 per cent of workless households were single-person 
households. Couples with young children dominated the mixed-
work category, accounting for 64 per cent of all households with 
one but not all adults in paid employment. Couples with young 
children accounted for almost 40 per cent of work-rich households, 
3.1  
Introduction 
3.2  
Changes in the 
Composition of 
Work-Poor 
Households 
1994-2000 
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and a further 27 per cent of work-rich households were single-
person households. 
Table 3.1: Household Employment Status by Household Type, 1994 and 2000 
  1994   2000  
 No Work 
Mixed-
Work All Work No Work 
Mixed-
Work All Work 
 % % % % % % 
One person < 65 years 24.9 – 26.8 31.1 – 22.0 
Couple, both < 65 years 7.1 6.6 14.9 9.7 6.3 15.2 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 30.4 63.5 39.2 13.8 53.4 41.8 
Couple with adult children only (18-29 years) 3.0 13.6 3.1 4.9 16.7 3.6 
Lone parent, youngest child<18 years 24.2 1.4 4.8 22.3 2.1 7.2 
Lone parent, adult children (18-29 years)  3.0 3.8 1.5 2.9 4.0 1.3 
Multi-generation, children under 30 years 2.7 6.5 1.5 2.2 7.4 1.4 
Other 4.6 4.5 8.2 13.1 10.2 7.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 2 between 1994 and 2000 the 
proportion of households with no-one in employment declined 
dramatically. As it did, the composition of workless households also 
changed. By the year 2000 traditional nuclear families, composed of 
a couple with younger children, accounted for only 14 per cent of all 
workless households. Single person households increased their share 
to 31 per cent of all workless households. Households headed by 
lone parents with young children continued to account for a 
substantial share of workless households: 22 per cent in 2000. The 
‘other’ household type also increased its share of total workless 
households, to 13 per cent in 2000. 
Households with couples dominated the mixed-work category: in 
2000, 53 per cent of mixed-work households were couples with 
children under 18 years, and a further 17 per cent were couples with 
adult children. The ‘other’ household type increased its share of the 
total to 10 per cent. As in 1994, couples with younger children 
dominated the work-rich households, accounting for 41 per cent of 
the total in 2000.  
Table 3.2 shows the educational attainment of the household 
reference person for workless households in 1994 and 2000. In 
general workless households are characterised by a very high 
concentration of low levels of qualification of household reference 
persons. In 1994 in almost two-thirds of all workless households the 
reference person had no qualifications, 19 per cent had attained a 
Junior Certificate level of education, and only 3 per cent had 
attended third level. Educational disadvantage was pervasive among 
workless households, but households headed by lone parents with 
adult children were particularly disadvantaged, with over 85 per cent 
of workless lone parents lacking any educational qualifications. So 
also were workless multigenerational households, 83 per cent of 
whom had no qualifications. 
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Table 3.2: Workless Households by Educational Attainment of Household Reference Person 
1994 and 2000 
 No Quals. Junior Cert. 
Leaving 
Cert. Third Level Total 
 % % % % % 
1994      
One person 61.0 21.9 10.0 7.0 100.0 
Couple 62.7 8.3 25.8 3.2 100.0 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 67.3 20.6 10.0 2.1 100.0 
Couple with adult children only (18-29 years) 69.9 25.7 2.4 2.1 100.0 
Lone parent, youngest child<18 years 61.7 18.5 17.3 2.5 100.0 
Lone parent, adult children (18-29 years) 85.3 2.7 12.0 0.0 100.0 
Multi-generation, children under 30 years 83.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Other 72.0 11.9 13.1 3.0 100.0 
All 65.3 18.6 12.6 3.4 100.0 
2000      
One person  56.7 22.4 15.4 5.5 100.0 
Couple, both 54.0 22.9 17.6 5.5 100.0 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 47.9 43.7 3.5 4.9 100.0 
Couple with adult children only (18-29 years) 41.1 5.3 34.0 19.7 100.0 
Lone parent, youngest child<18 years 26.4 32.2 30.8 10.7 100.0 
Lone parent, adult children (18-29 years) 55.8 36.9 0.0 7.2 100.0 
Multi-generation, children under 30 years 95.7 4.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Other 68.5 15.8 12.2 3.4 100.0 
All 50.1 25.9 17.1 6.9 100.0 
 
 
 
 
The decline in the overall workless rate appears to have led to 
some reduction in the strength of the relationship between 
educational attainment of the household reference person and 
worklessness. In 2000, in 50 per cent of workless households, the 
reference person had no qualifications, 26 per cent had attained a 
Junior Certificate level of education, and about 24 per cent had 
attained a Leaving Certificate or higher level of education. Workless 
multigenerational households remained particularly disadvantaged: 
in 95 per cent of such households, the reference person had no 
qualifications.  
Table 3.3 shows workless households by age group of the 
household reference person. In 1994, overall, workless households 
were distributed fairly evenly across the age groups: in 28 per cent of 
workless households the reference person was aged less than 35 
years, and in a further 28 per cent the reference person was aged 55-
64 years. However, there was substantial variation in the age pattern 
across different household types. By and large, if we exclude 
households with younger children, there is a concentration of 
workless households in the older age groups. For example, in 78 per 
cent of workless couple households the reference person was in the 
55-64 year age group. This was also true of 70 per cent of workless 
   COMPOSITION AND INCOME OF JOBLESS HOUSEHOLDS 35 
 
 
households composed of lone parents living with adult children, and 
63 per cent of workless households composed of couples with adult 
children.  
There is substantial stability between 1994 and 2000 in the age 
pattern of worklessness, although in the later years there is some 
strengthening of the tendency for a greater proportion of workless 
households to be concentrated in the older age groups. Thus, 
overall, 65 per cent of all workless households were aged between 
45 and 64, and 39 per cent were in the 55-64 year age group.  
Table 3.3: Workless Households by Age of Household Reference Person 1994 and 2000 
 <35 35-44 45-54 55-64 Total 
 % % % % % 
1994      
One person < 65 years 14.7 14.8 16.9 53.5 100.0 
Couple, both < 65 years 0.0 7.7 14.7 77.6 100.0 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 33.3 41.7 20.1 4.9 100.0 
Couple with adult children only (18-29 years) 0.0 0.0 36.9 63.1 100.0 
Lone parent, youngest child<18 years  51.7 26.8 18.2 3.3 100.0 
Lone parent, adult children (18-29 years) 0.0 24.2 6.5 69.3 100.0 
Multi-generation, children under 30 years 18.5 27.5 31.7 22.3 100.0 
Other 14.9 18.0 22.4 44.7 100.0 
All 27.5 25.7 19.0 27.8 100.0 
2000      
One person < 65 years 10.0 9.4 26.9 53.7 100.0 
Couple, both < 65 years 11.9 0.0 4.6 83.5 100.0 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 16.8 33.6 42.5 7.1 100.0 
Couple with adult children only (18-29 years) 0.0 0.0 18.4 81.6 100.0 
Lone parent, youngest child<18 years 61.7 19.7 15.7 2.9 100.0 
Lone parent, adult children (18-29 years) 0.0 0.0 42.4 57.6 100.0 
Multi-generation, children under 30 years 6.8 2.3 24.6 66.3 100.0 
Other 8.9 7.2 42.5 41.4 100.0 
All 21.6 12.9 26.4 39.0 100.0 
 
These results provide some explanation of why some households 
have not been integrated into the labour market despite the recent 
employment growth. The figures show that in 2000 work poverty 
was concentrated among households headed by lone parents, people 
aged 55-64, and those with poor qualifications. While the risk of 
work poverty has declined for all these groups since 1994 (see last 
chapter) they have continuing labour market disadvantages which do 
not disappear with increased demands for labour. The findings 
support the conclusion in the last chapter that the strength of the 
link between age and household joblessness has increased since 
1994, and has become more concentrated in households where the 
HRP is in the 55 to 64 year age group.  
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 Table 3.4 shows the distribution of disposable household income 
by household employment status in 1994 and 2000. In order to 
enhance comparability, the income data for 1994 are adjusted for 
changes in the Consumer Prices Index to 2000. The table shows a 
very strong relationship between household employment status and 
income, with workless households concentrated in the lower income 
groups, and both mixed- and all-work households distributed more 
evenly across income categories. In both years between 27 per cent 
and 30 per cent workless households received less than £100 per 
week in 2000 prices, and over three-quarters received less than £200 
per week. So during a period of sustained increases in national 
prosperity, there was no increase in the purchasing power of the 
vast majority of workless households. 
Table 3.4: Weekly Household Income by Household Employment Status 
                  (Income in 1994 adjusted to 2000 prices) 
  1994   2000  
 No Work Mixed All Work No Work Mixed All Work 
 % % % % % % 
<£100 27.3 0.8 3.2 29.5 0.6 1.8 
£100-200 48.5 11.0 11.1 48.2 3.5 7.1 
£200-300 18.2 25.7 20.4 17.4 13.1 11.4 
£300-400 4.3 20.9 20.8 3.8 15.2 12.4 
£400-500 1.5 17.1 18.1 0.7 14.0 13.1 
£500-600 0.2 10.8 10.4 0.3 13.4 13.7 
£600-700 – 5.5 6.5 – 11.2 11.0 
£700-800 – 2.7 3.4 0.2 8.1 9.8 
£800-900 – 1.5 2.4 – 7.1 6.7 
£900+ – 3.9 3.7 – 13.7 12.9 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Shifts in income distribution over time are also evident, but only 
in respect of mixed-work and all work households. For example, in 
1994 about one-quarter of both mixed-work and all-work 
households had weekly incomes in excess of £500 per week. By 
2000, well over half (55 per cent) of such households earned in 
excess of this income. 
We can also look at the proportion of households in each decile 
of the national income distribution. Table 3.5 reveals a very strong 
concentration of workless households at the bottom of the 
equivalised national income distribution.8 In 1994 one-third of 
workless households had household income in the bottom decile. 
This increased to 60 per cent of all workless households in 2000. In 
 
8 Equivalised income means that the figures are adjusted to take account of 
household size. The equivalence scale used is 1 for the first adult, .66 for any 
additional adults and .33 for any children under the age of 14.  
3.3  
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both years, between 75 per cent and 80 per cent of workless 
households were in the bottom two deciles. Almost half of 
households in which all eligible adults were at work in 1994 were in 
the top two income deciles, and there is some evidence of a decline 
in the proportion of work-rich households in the top two deciles, to 
less than 40 per cent in 2000. In both years, about half of all mixed-
work households were in the top 5 income deciles, as were about 80 
per cent of work-rich households. 
Table 3.5: Proportion of Households in each Decile of the National Income 
Distribution by Household Employment Status 
  1994   2000  
 No Work Mixed All Work No Work Mixed All Work 
 % % % % % % 
Lowest 38.6 8.8 2.5 60.7 5.2 2.6 
2nd 38.1 7.0 1.3 18.4 5.2 2.2 
3rd 8.9 7.7 2.6 9.1 9.3 2.5 
4th 7.8 12.5 4.4 4.7 13.1 6.2 
5th 2.0 12.7 7.4 3.1 14.7 8.7 
6th 1.4 13.5 8.5 2.1 11.7 11.1 
7th 1.4 13.0 10.5 1.0 14.1 10.1 
8th 0.9 11.0 14.6 0.3 9.9 15.6 
9th 0.6 7.4 22.1 0.5 9.0 18.1 
10th 0.3 6.2 26.1 0.0 7.9 22.9 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 Table 3.6 provides an analysis of the sources of household 
disposable income (market income plus social welfare transfers less 
income taxes).9 The household income is calculated from the 
individual questionnaires of all household members on their current 
income from earnings, social welfare payments, pensions, grants, 
interest on savings/investments, rental income, etc. The share of 
income derived from work is strongly related to the proportion of 
adults at work. Among households in which there was at least one 
working adult almost 80 per cent of total income was earned from 
work, and in work-rich households, over 90 per cent of total 
household income was earned. In 1994, in workless households, 
about 1 per cent of income was from work.10  
 
 
 
 
9 The figures in this section are based on non-equivalised household income. 
10 Income from work in workless households may be due to reporting errors or to 
income from household members outside our working age range (18-65 years). 
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Table 3.6: Source of Income as a Percentage of Total Disposable Income by Household 
Employment Rate, 1994 and 2000 
 
 Income 
from Work 
Private 
Income 
Pension 
Income 
(State and 
Private)1 
Social 
Welfare 
Income2 
Other 
Income3 Total 
1994 % % % % % % 
No Work 1.0 0.9 4.9 90.5 2.6 100.0 
Mixed 79.8 1.2 1.4 16.6 1.0 100.0 
All Work 92.0 1.2 0.4 5.7 0.7 100.0 
All 66.9 1.1 1.8 28.9 1.3 100.0 
       
2000       
No Work 1.1 4.1 8.2 84.7 1.9 100.0 
Mixed 83.7 1.2 2.0 12.7 0.9 100.0 
All Work 90.6 1.3 0.4 7.0 0.6 100.0 
All 76.0 1.7 2.0 19.4 0.9 100.0 
1  We have excluded households where the household reference person is 65 years or over, however 
households may contain another person in this age category. The early retired may also be in receipt of 
private pension income. 
2  Child benefit is included with social welfare income. 
3 Other income consists of strike pay, annuities/covenants and trusts and assistance from charities. 
 
The other main source of income was social welfare income. In 
1994 this accounted for 91 per cent of total household income for 
workless households, 17 per cent of income in households in which 
at least one adult was at work, and only 6 per cent of income in 
households in which all adults were in employment. Pension 
income, accounting for about 2 per cent of total household income, 
was inversely related to the proportion of adults at work, so pension 
income was a more important income source among workless 
households than in work-rich households. In general these patterns 
were stable over time. 
Table 3.7 disaggregates social welfare income by type of 
payment. In interpreting these results it is important to remember 
that the figures for work-rich and mixed-work households refer only 
to the minority of households that receive any social welfare 
income.11 
Here we see significant changes over time. In 1994, 
unemployment-related payments accounted for 47 per cent of total 
social welfare income for all households, and the share of 
unemployment-related payments in total income was highest in 
mixed-work households. In 2000, however, unemployment-related 
payments only accounted for about 27 per cent of total social 
welfare income. The latest figures show that among work-poor 
households where social welfare income was the most significant 
source of income – sickness/disability benefits accounted for the 
biggest share (38 per cent) followed by lone parents allowances (30 
 
11 The great majority of work-poor households (91 per cent) receive income from 
benefits compared to 35 per cent of mixed work households and 20 per cent of 
work-rich households. 
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per cent) while unemployment payments only amounted to 20 per 
cent.  
Table 3.7: Welfare Income Type as a Percentage of Total Welfare Income by Household 
Employment Rate 1994 and 2000 
 
Employment 
Rate Elderly 
Un-
employment 
Sick and 
Incapacitated 
Lone 
Parents 
and 
Survivors 
Family 
Income 
Supports1 
Supplementary 
and Other 
Schemes (incl. 
Occup. Injuries) 
1994 % % % % % % 
No Work 4.7 43.9 18.4 24.8 5.2 3.6 
Mixed 6.4 45.6 19.2 14.4 11.5 3.4 
All Work 12.6 35.6 8.9 27.3 13.3 2.4 
All 6.3 43.6 17.6 21.0 8.6 3.4 
       
2000       
No Work 4.2 19.3 36.9 27.7 7.9 4.9 
Mixed 6.0 28.3 27.5 17.4 16.4 6.2 
All Work 7.8 23.4 9.7 32.9 21.1 6.4 
All 5.9 23.8 25.8 25.2 14.8 5.8 
 1 Family income supports include Child Benefit payments, Maternity Benefit, Family Income Supplement and 
Carer’s Allowance. 
 
 
 
Lone parents and survivors payments accounted for 22 per cent 
of total social welfare income in 1994 and 27 per cent in 2000. In 
both years, this type of social welfare income was more important 
for households at both extremes of the household employment rate, 
households with either no or all adults employed, and its share in 
total income dipped in the mixed-work categories, presumably 
because of the importance of such incomes to all lone parent 
households, irrespective of work-status.  
Sickness and incapacity-related payments increased in importance 
over time. In 1994 such payments accounted for 18 per cent of total 
social welfare payments for all households. In 2000, the proportion 
had increased to 27 per cent. In that year, sickness and incapacity 
income accounted for 38 per cent of total social welfare income in 
workless households, and for only 11 per cent of social welfare 
income where all adults were at work. 
Table 3.8 allows us to disaggregate unemployment-related 
payments in greater detail. In 1994, almost three-quarters of total 
unemployment related benefits took the form of Unemployment 
Assistance (UA), reflecting the high national rate of long-term 
unemployment among individuals at that time. In workless 
households, 83 per cent of unemployment-related benefit income 
took the form of Unemployment Assistance. In 2000, there was a 
more even balance between Unemployment Benefit (UB) and 
Assistance. Among all households, about 40 per cent of 
unemployment-related benefit income took the form of 
Unemployment Benefit, and a further 44 per cent was in the form 
of Unemployment Assistance. Even among workless households, 
the share of Unemployment Assistance in total unemployment-
related benefit income had fallen to 60 per cent in 2000.  
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Table 3.8: Unemployment-related Benefits by Type and by 
Household Employment Rate 1994 and 2000 
 
Unemployment 
Benefit 
Unemployment 
Assistance 
Part-Time Job 
Incentive 
Scheme + 
Back to Work 
Allowance 
Total 
1994  % %  %  % 
No Work 16.5 83.3 0.2 100.0 
Mixed 29.3 68.4 2.4 100.0 
     
2000     
No Work 39.3 60.6 0.1 100.0 
Mixed 44.8 40.0 15.2 100.0 
All 40.1 44.0 15.9 100.0 
Note: Work-rich households are excluded from the table because so few are in 
receipt of unemployment related payments. 
 
 
 
It is interesting that in mixed-work households where there are 
both employed and unemployed adults, the unemployment benefits 
are more likely to take the form of insurance based UB, while in 
workless households, the unemployed were more likely to be reliant 
on means-tested UA. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis 
that means-tested benefits tend to discourage employment among 
other household members. 
Over this period, the importance of social welfare based 
activation measures increased substantially. Overall, the share of 
unemployment-related payments represented by income from the 
Part-time Job Incentive Scheme and the Back to Work Allowance 
Scheme increased from less than 2 per cent in 1994 to 16 per cent in 
2000. 12 
 
 This chapter has examined aspects of the composition of workless 
households as well as the relationship between household 
employment status and level and sources of income.  
The analysis of composition suggest that while work-poor 
households are becoming less prevalent they continue to have a 
number of characteristics that distinguish them. These are: having 
an older household reference person, having poor educational 
qualifications, being a lone parent or being a single-person 
household. These characteristics provide some clue as to why they 
have not been integrated into the workforce despite recent 
employment growth. There is some evidence that the concentration 
of joblessness among older age groups has increased over time while 
 
12 A minority of work-rich households were also in receipt of these activation 
payment. Only 6 per cent of work-rich households had received any kind of 
unemployment payment during the year (compared to 14 per cent of mixed work 
households and 26 per cent of work-poor households) and a third of these had 
received activation payments. 
3.5 
Conclusion 
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the concentration among those with no qualifications has declined 
somewhat. Single-person households have also become more 
prevalent among the work-poor. The findings on sources of income 
suggest that household joblessness has also become increasingly 
concentrated amongst those with long-term illnesses or disabilities. 
One significant change in the composition of work-poor 
households between 1994 and 2000 was the decline in the 
proportion of traditional nuclear families in this category. In 1994, 
about 30 per cent of all workless households were couples with 
children under 18 years but by the year 2000 they accounted for only 
14 per cent of all workless households. This change has lead to a 
significant reduction in the proportion of Irish children living in 
work-poor households, from 27 per cent in 1994 to 9 per cent in 
2000. However, children in households headed by lone parents 
continue to be exposed to a high risk of household joblessness. 
Lone parents with children under 18 years still accounted for 22 per 
cent of workless households in 2000. 
There was a very strong relationship between household 
employment status and income, with workless households strongly 
concentrated at the lowest income levels. In both 1994 and 2000 up 
to 30 per cent of workless households received less than £100 per 
week in year-2000 prices, and over three-quarters of workless 
households received less than £200 per week. So during a period of 
sustained and substantial increases in national living standards, there 
was no increase in the purchasing power for the declining group of 
workless households.  
This pattern of unchanging inequalities associated with 
household employment status is confirmed when we compare 
household incomes with the structure of national income 
distribution. In both 1994 and 2000 between 75 per cent and 80 per 
cent of workless households received incomes in the bottom two 
deciles of the national income distribution. 
When we turned to an analysis of income sources we found that 
the source of income was strongly related to household employment 
status. Workless households derived virtually no income from work, 
and over 80 per cent from social welfare sources. Households in 
which some or all adults worked derived well over 80 per cent of 
their total income from work, and were thus much less reliant on 
social welfare, or any other income source.  
Among households in receipt of social welfare income, 
unemployment-related payments were the most common type of 
payment in 1994 however, following the decline in aggregate 
national unemployment, the importance of unemployment-related 
payments fell. Sickness and incapacity-related payments, as well as 
lone-parents payments became much more prominent over time, 
with the former accounting for 37 per cent of total social welfare 
income and the latter accounting for another 27 per cent in 2000. 
This meant in the later year, sickness and incapacity-relating 
payments represented the single most important payment among 
workless households. 
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There were also important changes over time in the structure of 
unemployment-related payments. In 1994, almost three-quarters of 
total unemployment-related payments took the form of 
Unemployment Assistance, reflecting the high national rate of long-
term unemployment among individuals at that time. In workless 
households, 83 per cent of unemployment-related benefit income 
took the form of Unemployment Assistance. In 2000, there was a 
more even balance between Unemployment Benefit and Assistance. 
Among all households, about 40 per cent of unemployment-related 
benefit income took the form of Unemployment Benefit, and a 
further 44 per cent was in the form of Unemployment Assistance. 
Over this period, the importance of social welfare based activation 
measures, the Part-time Job Incentive Scheme and the Back to 
Work Allowance Scheme, increased substantially, and in the year 
2000 accounted for 16 per cent of unemployment-related payments, 
because they are paid to people returning to work they are most 
important in households with members in employment.  
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4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
HOUSEHOLD WORK 
SITUATION FOR POVERTY, 
DEPRIVATION AND 
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
In this chapter we shift our focus from the composition of work-
poor households and the risk factors associated with joblessness to 
consider the consequences of work poverty. A large part of the 
increasing concern with concentration of employment 
opportunities among certain households follows from a fear that 
such concentration will be accompanied by a corresponding 
polarisation of households in terms of income and standards of 
living. In the previous chapters we saw that in numerical terms 
there has not been a polarisation of households, the proportion of 
work-poor households has declined significantly over the period 
1994-2000 while the proportion of mixed-work and work-rich 
households have both increased. However, there remains the 
possibility that the shrinking pool of work-poor households have 
experienced a deterioration of their conditions either in absolute or 
relative terms. In other words there may have been a polarisation in 
conditions between households with no members in employment 
and those with some or all members in work. 
To address this issue we compare the income levels and 
experience of deprivation of working-age households (i.e. where at 
least one member of the household was in the age range 18-64 
years)  with differing connections to the labour market. We examine 
whether there has been a deterioration in their circumstances over 
time, both in absolute terms (i.e., compared to work-poor 
households in 1994) and relative to work-rich and mixed-work 
households (i.e., has the gap between work-poor and other 
households widened since 1994). We also consider the 
consequences of household employment for the subjective well-
being of household members. This analysis taps into concerns 
expressed by critics of the Celtic Tiger, that the ‘quality of life’ of 
those excluded from the economic boom will have deteriorated 
because the surrounding prosperity creates a greater sense of 
4.1 
Introduction 
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alienation (O’Hearn, 1998), and that the quality of life of the work-
rich has deteriorated because they have too little time to spend on 
other non-work activities (e.g., Ryan, 2003).   
 
 We begin our analysis of the consequences of the distribution of 
work for economic life-chances by focusing on income poverty. In 
Table 4.1 we look at the relationship between household 
employment situation and income poverty, defined as falling 
respectively below 50 per cent, 60 per cent and 70 per cent of 
household disposable median equivalent income. Concentrating 
first on the most extreme definition of poverty we can see that, 
already by 1994, there was a clear relationship between the 
distribution of employment opportunities and income poverty. At 
this point one in ten households with no-one in work fell below the 
50 per cent poverty line. The corresponding figure for mixed-work 
households was 4 per cent and for work-rich households was at just 
above 1 per cent. The work-poor households were thus exposed to 
a risk of poverty at this level that was two and half times higher 
than for the mixed households and nine times higher than for 
work-rich households. Before making comparisons with the 
situation in 2000, it is necessary to take account of the fact that 
overall, there was a threefold rise over time from 5 per cent to 16 
per cent in the number of households falling below the 50 per cent 
threshold. However, exposure to higher levels of poverty was 
spread very unevenly across households depending on employment 
status. Thus by 2000 almost three-quarters of households where 
no-one was in employment fell below the 50 per cent line. This 
compares with less than 10 per cent in mixed households and only 
4 per cent in work-rich households. Therefore, the relative 
disadvantage of work-poor households increased over time: in 2000 
work-poor household were twenty times more likely to be poor 
than work-rich households compared to 1994 when their risk was 
nine times greater.13 The differential poverty risk between work-
poor households and mixed households also increased over the 
period, from three to one in 1994 to seven to one in 2000.   
Turning to the poverty line represented by 60 per cent of 
median income, we find that in 1994 just over two out of five work-
poor households were found below this line. For the mixed 
households the corresponding figure was just less than one in ten 
and for work-rich households it was as low as one in forty. Between 
1994 and 2000 the overall number below the 60 per cent line 
increased from 14 per cent to 22 per cent. In this case, however, the 
rate of increase was much more evenly spread across the 
employment situation of the household. 
 
13 These figures are calculated by dividing the percentage of households below the 
poverty line in no-work household by the percentage below the poverty line in 
work-rich households in each year. 
4.2 
Income Poverty 
and 
Employment  
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Table 4.1: Risk of Income Poverty by Household Employment 
Status by Year 
 % < 50% of Median % <60% of Median % <70% of Median 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 
No work 11.2 73.6 41.4 85.2 75.8 90.7 
Mixed 4.1 9.9 9.1 17.5 15.9 25.3 
All work 1.3 3.7 2.7 6.3 4.0 9.4 
All  4.7 16.2 14.0 21.9 25.0 27.1 
 
For work-poor households the number below the 60 per cent 
line more than doubled to reach a level of 85 per cent. The rate for 
the mixed group also came close to doubling in reaching a level of 
17 per cent. Finally, the figure for the work-rich group more than 
doubled and by 2000 was just in excess of 6 per cent. As a 
consequence of these changes the vast majority of work-poor 
households fell below the 60 per cent income line but this situation 
had come about largely because of the overall increase in poverty 
rather than because of any significant change in the differential in 
risk between work-poor and work-rich households. Thus in 1994 
the former were fifteen times more likely to be poor and in 2000 
fourteen times more likely. 
Finally, the 70 per cent median income poverty line represents 
another type of case where the overall poverty rate remained fairly 
constant – going from 25 per cent to 27 per cent – allowing fairly 
straightforward comparisons over time. In the case of work-poor 
households the poverty rate rose from 76 per cent to 91 per cent 
constituting a proportionate increase of almost 20 per cent. The 
mixed group households saw a corresponding increase from 16 per 
cent to 25 per cent involving an increase of the order of 60 per 
cent. However, the sharpest increase was observed for the work-
rich households where the relevant figure more than doubled from 
4 per cent to 9 per cent. As a consequence, while the absolute 
difference between work-rich and work-poor households in 
numbers under the 70 per cent line rose, the differential risk 
declined from nineteen to one to less than ten to one. 
It should be clear by now that interpretation of the trend in 
poverty rates across employment status is by no means a simple 
matter. The conclusions one draws will be influenced by the 
poverty line on which one focuses and whether one focuses on 
absolute or relative change. The situation is also complicated by the 
fact that the distribution of households across the categories of the 
classification of employment concentration changes so dramatically 
in a short period of time. This produces results that at first glance 
seem paradoxical. Thus, in the case of the 70 per cent income line 
while the overall rate of increase in poverty is extremely modest, at 
the same time a substantial increase in the rate is observed within 
each of the sub-categories of employment status. The paradox is 
explained by the substantial increase in numbers in the categories 
with lower, although increasing, risk of poverty. Change for the 
employment status sub-groups has taken place in the context of an 
overall increase in income inequality that is reflected in the relatively 
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sharp increase in the number of households below the 50 per cent 
and 60 per cent lines. The major change for the work-poor group is 
the dramatic increase in the extent to which they are concentrated 
below the 50 per cent line. Although the other groups also 
experienced an increase in exposure to this risk it was on a much 
lower scale and consequently a sharp increase in differentials 
between the work-poor group and the others was observed. At the 
60 per cent line on the other hand the relative increase is more even 
and at the 60 per cent line the increase is sharpest for the work-rich 
households. Thus, while as we might have expected, the situation of 
the diminishing work-poor households deteriorated over time so 
too did that of the rapidly expanding categories of mixed and work-
rich households. 
In order to understand the nature of the changes that have taken 
place we need to take into account not only trends in poverty rates 
over time but also the change in the distribution of households 
across employment status. This is illustrated when, as in Table 4.2, 
we turn our attention from risk of poverty to incidence of poverty. 
In other words, we focus not on the chances of falling below the 
poverty line but on the composition of the poor. In the case of the 
50 per cent line there has been a shift over time in the importance 
of work-poor households. Such households now constitute almost 
two-thirds of those below that threshold compared with just over 
half in 1994. For the 60 per cent and 70 per cent lines, however, the 
trend is in the opposite direction and work-poor households now 
constitute a smaller proportion. In 1994 they made up two-thirds of 
those below 60 per cent of median income but by 2000 this had 
fallen to below six out of ten. Similarly, in 1994 they made up just 
over two-thirds of those below the 70 per cent line but by 2000 this 
had fallen to nearly half. Correspondingly, the number of work-rich 
households below 60 per cent of median income rose from 7 per 
cent to 14 per cent and the number under the 70 per cent threshold 
went from 6 per cent to over 17 per cent. Thus income poverty is a 
problem affecting predominantly work-poor households only if one 
restricts ones focus to the 50 per cent line. At the same time it is 
necessary to take into account that by 2000 over half those located 
below the 70 per cent line were also below the 50 per cent line 
whereas in 1994 this was true of less than one in five. 
Table 4.2: Incidence of Income Poverty by Household Employment 
Status by Year 
 % < 50% of Median % <60% of Median % <70% of Median 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 
No work 53.0 66.6 65.3 56.9 67.0 49.1 
Mixed 37.2 22.2 27.8 29.0 27.3 33.8 
All work 9.8 11.2 6.8 14.1 5.6 17.1 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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 Poverty is now widely conceptualised in terms of exclusion from 
the life of one’s society because of a lack of resources, and so 
involves experiencing various forms of what a particular society 
would regard as serious deprivation (Townsend 1979). A definition 
of poverty in very much these terms has been enshrined in the 
National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS 1997, 1999). As has been 
argued in previous work, income on its own has limitations for 
capturing such exclusion. Those below lower relative income lines 
in particular are often not those experiencing the corresponding 
levels of deprivation. Consequently, income and deprivation 
approaches to identifying the most disadvantaged tend to identify 
groups with quite different socio-demographic profiles (Callan et al., 
1993; Nolan and Whelan, 1996). This has been shown to be true 
across a wide range of European Union countries (Whelan et al., 
2001; Layte et al., 2001.)  
The Irish case is even more complex, because the very rapid 
growth in average incomes since 1994 poses particular problems in 
capturing what is generally regarded as exclusion. In such 
circumstances, relying on relative income lines alone could lead to 
particularly misleading conclusions. Direct measures of deprivation 
can provide a valuable and complementary source of information in 
measuring poverty and assessing poverty trends. A measure of 
poverty combining both low income and manifest deprivation was 
developed at The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) 
initially using the 1987 survey results. Callan, Nolan and Whelan 
(1993) and Nolan and Whelan (1996) used a range of deprivation 
indicators to produce different indices of deprivation, and identified 
those both below relative income poverty lines and experiencing 
what was termed basic deprivation as experiencing generalised 
deprivation due to lack of resources. This ‘consistent’ poverty 
measure was subsequently the basis for the global poverty reduction 
target adopted in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy. Given the 
scale of economic change that took place between 1994 and 2000, 
we feel that a sensible approach is to examine trends in life-style 
deprivation before proceeding to examine comparable trends in the 
consistent poverty measure. We concentrate on the basic and 
secondary deprivation dimensions, which have earlier been shown 
to bear the stronger relationship to household income. Table 4.3 
shows the nature of the items involved. Basic life-style deprivation 
items focus on current economic pressures as reflected in the 
enforced lack of items such as food and clothing and the experience 
of debt problems. Secondary life-style deprivation involves the 
enforced absence of consumer durables such as a car, a telephone 
and leisure activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 
Life-style 
Deprivation and 
Employment 
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Table 4.3: Life-style Deprivation Dimensions 
Basic Dimension 
A meal with meat, chicken or fish 
A warm, waterproof overcoat 
Two pairs of strong shoes 
A roast joint of meat or its equivalent once a week 
New, not second-hand clothes 
Go without a substantial meal 
Go without heat 
Go into debt for ordinary living expenses 
 
Secondary Dimension 
Telephone 
Car/Van 
A week’s annual holiday away from home 
Central heating 
Be able to save regularly 
Daily newspaper 
Hobby or leisure activity 
Presents for friends or family 
Able to afford afternoon or night out 
 
In Table 4.4 we show the relationship between basic and 
secondary deprivation and the concentration of employment for 
1994 and 2000. It is clear that each of the three groups experienced 
a substantial reduction over time in the level of basic deprivation 
but that the extent of that reduction was directly related to access to 
employment by household members. Thus, for the work-poor 
households the level for 2000 falls to approximately two-fifths of 
that for 1994. For the mixed households the corresponding figure is 
nearly one-third and for the work-rich group it is close to 50 per 
cent. The last three columns in Table 4.4 report the corresponding 
analysis for secondary deprivation. Once again we observe a 
reduction in deprivation households for all categories but in this 
case the reduction is relatively modest for the work-poor 
households and the main contrast is between them and all other 
households. Thus for the work-poor-group their level of secondary 
deprivation is just over 70 per cent of that pertaining in 1994 while 
for the other groups the level is halved. 
Table 4.4: Average Levels of Basic and Secondary Deprivation by 
Employment Status and Time of Survey 
 Basic Deprivation Secondary Deprivation 
 1994 2000 2000 as % 
of 1994 
1994 2000 2000 as % 
of 1994 
Work-Poor 1.79 0.69 38.7 3.74 2.66 71.1 
Mixed 0.41 0.12 29.5 1.65 0.85 51.8 
Work-Rich 0.20 0.09 47.3 1.07 0.55 51.3 
Total 0.64 0.19 29.6 1.90 0.96 50.4 
 
The NAPS consistent poverty measure requires that in order for 
a household to be counted as poor it must not only fall below the 
relevant income poverty threshold but must also experience 
enforced absence of at least one basic deprivation item. In this 
context it is interesting to look again at the trends in basic and 
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secondary deprivation using as an indicator the percentage lacking 
at least one item. From Table 4.5 we can see that, among the work-
poor households, the number of households lacking a basic 
deprivation item was halved between 1994 and 2000 as the figure 
fell from almost six out of ten to less than three out of ten. For the 
mixed households the corresponding decline was from just over 
one in five households to one in twelve. Finally, for the work-rich 
households the relevant figure went from nearly one in seven 
households to just one in sixteen. In contrast, the vast majority of 
work-poor households continued to suffer the enforced absence of 
at least one secondary item: as the number in this situation went 
from just above nine out of ten to just over eight out of ten. The 
decline in secondary deprivation was much more pronounced for 
other households. While in 1994 almost two-thirds of the mixed 
category households experienced this type of deprivation, six years 
later this was true of only four out of ten. Correspondingly, while 
one in two work-rich households were deprived of such an item at 
the earlier date, over time this fell to three out of ten. 
Table 4.5: Risk of Basic and Secondary Deprivation by House- 
hold Employment Status by Year 
 % Lacking at Least One Basic 
Item  
% Lacking at Least One 
Secondary Item 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 
No work 57.9 29.3 91.0 82.1 
Mixed 22.1 8.1 64.6 41.9 
All work 14.6 6.4 52.8 29.5 
All 27.4 10.3 66.3 41.5 
 
As a consequence of the strength of the relationship between 
declining deprivation and employment status, we find that, despite 
the changed distribution of employment opportunities documented 
earlier, the composition of the deprived groups in terms of 
employment concentration remained a good deal more stable than 
was the case for the income poverty lines. From Table 4.6 we can 
see that for basic deprivation the proportion accounted for by 
work-poor households declined from 47 per cent to 41 per cent. 
For the mixed group the proportion decreased from three out of 
nine to nearly three out of ten. At the same time there was a 
corresponding increase for the work-rich group from almost two 
out of ten to three out of ten. For secondary deprivation the extent 
of change was rather modest with a marginal increase from 28 per 
cent to 35 per cent observed for the work-rich group being 
counterbalanced by smaller shifts in the opposite direction for the 
other groups. 
The broad pattern of change is clear. There was a general and 
substantial reduction in levels of deprivation in a relatively short 
period. In relation to basic deprivation this was relatively even 
across households with different employment statuses. As a 
consequence by 2000 a substantial majority of the now smaller 
group who made up the work-poor group now managed to entirely 
avoid exposure to such deprivation. However, in relation to 
secondary deprivation improvement was significantly less 
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pronounced among work-poor households. As a consequence 
inequalities between this group and the work-rich and mixed 
households widened. Taken together our findings show that work-
poor households, although they became increasingly exposed to 
income poverty, were able to take advantage of overall 
improvements in living standards to rise above the threshold set by 
basic deprivation. However, in important respects they fell behind 
other households in the standard of living available to them. 
Although reductions in the level of basic deprivation clearly 
constitute an achievement, the widening gap in other respects 
between work-poor households and others clearly constitutes a 
cause for concern.    
Table 4.6: Incidence of Basic and Secondary Deprivation by 
Household Employment Status by Year 
 % Of Those Lacking at Least 
One Basic Item  
% Of Those Lacking at 
Least One Secondary Item 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 
No work 46.7 40.7 30.4 28.3 
Mixed 34.6 28.8 41.7 36.8 
All work 18.7 30.5 27.9 34.9 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 We have seen that there have been significant reductions 
between 1994 and 2000 in the basic index of deprivation, which is 
the measure we have used to date together with low income to 
identify households excluded because of a lack of resources. As in 
earlier work (Callan et al., 1996, Layte et al., 2000), we now combine 
basic deprivation with relative income poverty lines to construct a 
‘consistent’ poverty measure, distinguishing households that both 
have relatively low income and are experiencing basic deprivation.  
The use of a range of income lines allows us to see the 
consequences of varying the income criterion for the numbers and 
types of households identified as poor, so we again employ relative 
income lines as 50, 60 and 70 per cent of median disposable 
income. From Table 4.7 we can see that the trend in consistent 
poverty over time, for working age households, is highly dependent 
on the choice of income line. At the 50 per cent line there is a slight 
increase in the number above the threshold from 2.5 per cent to 3.9 
per cent. At the 60 per cent line there is little change with the figure 
going down from 6.9 per cent to 5.2 per cent. At the 70 per cent 
line there is a sharp decrease from 12.9 per cent to 6.1 per cent. 
Turning to the impact of employment concentration, we can see 
that at the 50 per cent line there is a sharp increase from 9 per cent 
to 22 per cent for the work-poor. For the remaining groups the 
numbers below this threshold were already close to zero by 1994 
so, not surprisingly, little change is observed over time. At the 60 
per cent line we see little movement for any of the groups. The 
pattern of no change continues at the 70 per cent line for the work-
rich group. In fact, in both years this group have consistent poverty 
rates close to zero at all three lines. 
4.4 
Consistent 
Poverty and 
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Table 4.7: Risk of Consistent Poverty by Household Employment 
Status by Year 
 % <50% of Median % <60% of Median % <70% of Median 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 
No work 8.8 22.1 25.0 25.4 45.6 27.2 
Mixed 0.9 1.5 2.6 2.7 5.7 4.3 
All work 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.0 
All 2.5 3.9 6.9 5.2 12.9 6.1 
 
Both the mixed and work-poor households, on the other hand, 
experienced a decline in risk of consistent poverty at the 70 per cent 
line. For the former the fall is modest with the rate going from 5.7 
per cent to 4.3 per cent. For the work-poor group on the other 
hand there is a substantial decline from 46 per cent to 27 per cent. 
Thus, we observe a polarisation within work-poor households with 
an increasing number being exposed to the extreme type of 
disadvantage associated with being below the 50 per cent income 
line and suffering enforced lack of at least one basic deprivation 
item but a substantially reduced number being found to both lack 
such an item while at the same time falling between 50 per cent and 
70 per cent of median income. The respective figures for this latter 
comparison are 36.8 per cent for 1994 and 5.1 per cent for 2000. 
The consequences of the combined effect of these changes and 
the redistribution of household categories for the composition of 
the consistently poor are set out in Table 4.8. There is very little in 
the way of dramatic change. The substantial increase in the size of 
the work-rich category means that, despite their stable low risk 
levels, they come to constitute a larger proportion of the consistent 
poor at the 60 per cent and 70 per cent lines. However, at all three 
lines the work-poor constitute a substantial majority of the 
consistently poor. The extent of their domination declines, 
however, as one moves from the 50 per cent to the 70 per cent line 
with the relevant figure declining from 82 per cent to 66 per cent. 
There is a corresponding increase from 14 per cent to 26 per cent 
for the group of mixed households and from 4 per cent to 8 per 
cent for the work-rich households. 
Table 4.8: Incidence of Consistent Poverty by Household 
Employment Status by Year 
 % <50% of Median % <60% of Median % <70% of Median 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 
No work 78.5 81.9 80.7 72.3 78.2 65.7 
Mixed 16.0 13.9 16.5 19.2 18.8 25.9 
All work 5.5 4.2 2.8 8.5 3.0 8.5 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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 In this section we seek to examine the relationship between 
employment opportunities and subjective well-being and the 
manner in which this has changed over time. We start by looking at 
the impact of employment status on subjective economic strain, 
which we define as a household experiencing “great difficulty” or 
“difficulty” in making ends meet. The second outcome on which 
we focus our attention is psychological distress. For this dimension 
we focus on the household reference person. We use the General 
Health Questionnaire (GHQ) and ask respondents 12 questions 
about their present mental and emotional condition “over the last 
few weeks” in comparison to their normal condition. Normally a 
score of two is taken as a threshold and respondents with higher 
scores are classified as suffering from psychological distress. In 
Table 4.9 we show risk levels for 1994 and 2000 by employment 
status for both economic strain and psychological distress by 
employment status.  
The first point to note is that, overall, increased prosperity was 
associated with substantial declines in the levels of economic strain 
and psychological distress. The percentage of households 
experiencing economic strain almost halved between 1994 and 2000 
while the level of psychological distress among household heads 
declined by a third. Focusing first on economic strain we find the 
largest reduction was for the work-rich and mixed households 
where levels were halved. For work-poor households the 
corresponding reduction was of the order of one-quarter. For 
psychological distress, on the other hand, the reduction was more 
even across household types. The rate decreased by about one-
quarter for work-poor and mixed households but by one-third for 
work-rich households. 
Table 4.9: Risk of Economic Strain and Psychological Distress by 
Household Employment Status by Year 
 % Experiencing Economic 
Strain  
% Above Psychological 
Distress Threshold 
 1994 2000 2000 as %  
of 1994 
1994 2000 2000 as % 
of 1994 
No Work 55.0 40.4 73.5 44.0 34.1 77.4 
Mixed 24.7 13.5 54.6 20.4 15.6 76.5 
All Work 13.0 7.6 58.6 16.2 10.8 66.5 
All 27.3 14.6 53.3 24.3 15.9 65.4 
 
The effect of the combination of these trends and the change in 
the distribution of employment status over time was to produce a 
situation whereby by 2000 the work-poor constituted slightly less of 
those experiencing economic strain and the work-rich slightly more 
(see Table 4.10). In the case of psychological distress there were 
comparable shifts but of a somewhat greater magnitude. In 2000 
the work-poor constituted 31 per cent of those experiencing 
psychological distress down from 41 per cent in 1994, while the 
proportion accounted for by the work-rich rose from 24 per cent to 
33 per cent producing a reversal in their relative importance. 
4.5 
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Table 4.10: Incidence of Economic Strain and Psychological 
Distress by Household Employment Status by Year 
 % Of Those Experiencing 
Economic Strain  
% Of Those Above 
Psychological Distress 
Threshold 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 
No work 44.6 40.7 41.4 30.8 
Mixed 38.8 33.5 34.8 35.8 
All work 16.7 25.8 23.8 33.4 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 While the major concern for those studying changing work 
patterns has been with work-poor households, an additional focus 
has been on the possibility that work-rich households may 
experience a diminution in their quality of life as a consequence of 
the stresses involved in balancing work and non-work demands. 
Thus as Fisher (2002), notes the term “work-life balance” appears 
widely in popular parlance, and stories of threats to quality of life 
from increasingly pervasive demands of work figure prominently in 
many industrialised countries at the start of the twenty-first century. 
Concern with quality of life issues has been prompted not just by 
extent of engagement in paid work by household members but also 
by a perception of an increased intensification of work associated 
with changing work practices. Thus as Gallie (2002, pp. 104-105) 
notes, faced by increased competitive pressures employers have 
tended to seek greater flexibility in work practices while 
accompanying technological change has tended to disrupt 
established work practices. 
We do not have available the type of information necessary to 
offer a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the changing 
distribution of work on quality of life. However, for both 1994 and 
2000 we can draw on information relating to respondents’ 
evaluations of their main activity and their leisure time. By 
comparing variations across household work situation and time we 
can at least get some insight into the extent to which respondents’ 
evaluations are in line with the speculations in the work-balance 
literature.  
Turning our attention first to satisfaction with “work or main 
activity” and focusing on the household reference person, we find 
that there is a sharp contrast between work-poor households and all 
others (Table 4.11). Just less than one-half of the work-poor group 
were satisfied with their main activity compared to just over three-
quarters of mixed households and over eight in ten of those in 
work-rich households. Comparing the situation in 2000 with that in 
1994, we find that there was a general trend towards increased 
satisfaction, which operated across all three groups, leaving the 
relativities between groups largely unchanged. Thus, there was no 
evidence that the increase in the number of work-rich households 
was accompanied by a declining level of satisfaction with work 
situation. 
 
4.6 
The 
Distribution of 
Work and 
Quality of Life 
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Table 4.11: Satisfaction with Work or Main Activity by Employ-
ment Status and Date of Survey 
 1994 2000 
 % Satisfied % Satisfied 
No work 44.5 53.6 
Mixed 76.6 80.9 
All work 82.0 86.1 
 
In Table 4.12 we focus on satisfaction with leisure time. In 1994 
there was almost no difference in levels of such satisfaction among 
the heads of households associated with household employment 
status. In each category close two-thirds of respondents were 
satisfied with their leisure time. Over time one observes an increase 
in the level of satisfaction. The increase is most notable for the 
work-poor group where a rise of 10 percentage points is involved, 
compared to an increase of 5 percentage points for the mixed 
group and 6 percentage points for the work-rich group. Thus we 
observe improvements in levels of satisfaction both for main 
activity and leisure time. There is no evidence from this analysis 
that the increase in work-rich households has involved deterioration 
in the manner in which they assess their work activities or that an 
increased ability to participate in paid work has been achieved at the 
price of a perception of reduced opportunity to benefit from leisure 
time. 
Table 4.12: Satisfaction with Leisure Time by Employment Status 
and Date of Survey 
 1994 2000 
 % Satisfied % Satisfied 
No work 66.6 76.0 
Mixed 67.7 73.1 
All work 67.0 73.4 
 
The results reported above offer a fairly sanguine picture of the 
consequences for quality of life of the increase in the number of 
work-rich households. However, the possibility remains that the 
tensions provoked by increasing numbers of work-rich households 
may be concentrated on particular sub-sets of households. The 
most plausible candidates here are households made up of couples 
with children (and lone parents with children). It might also be that 
such tensions impact more strongly on the partners of reference 
persons in such couple households rather than on the reference 
persons per se. Below we repeat our earlier analysis focusing on such 
households and reporting results for both partners. Focusing first 
on the reference person, from Table 4.13 we can see that in 1994 
the level of satisfaction with main activity among work-poor 
households in this category was particularly low with only 25 per 
cent expressing satisfaction. This compares with almost 80 per cent 
in the mixed and work-rich categories. Over time we once again 
observe an improvement in satisfaction for all categories. This is 
marginal in the case of the mixed group. However, for the work-
poor category it involves an increase of 15 percentage points and 
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for the work-rich category one of 8 per cent. Thus the shift in 
relativities between the work-rich and work-poor categories was 
associated not with deterioration in the situation of the former but 
an improvement in the circumstances of the latter.  
In the case of the partners it is again those in work-rich 
households who are most satisfied with their main activity in both 
1994 and 2000, although the differences between household types 
are narrower in 2000. In general, partners in work-poor households 
are significantly more satisfied with their own non-employed status 
than the reference person.  
Table 4.13: Satisfaction with Work or Main Activity by Employ-
ment Status and Date of Survey for Couples with 
Children 
 1994 1994 2000 2000 
 % Satisfied % Satisfied % Satisfied % Satisfied 
 Reference 
Person  
Partner Reference 
Person  
Partner 
No work 24.6 55.8 35.8 77.1 
Mixed 77.7 78.0 81.5 83.1 
All work 81.3 83.8 89.9 85.9 
  
In Table 4.14 we report the results relating to satisfaction with 
leisure time for households comprised of couples with children. In 
1994 there was relatively little variation across sub-groups in 
reported level of satisfaction of the reference person on this 
dimension, with just over 60 per cent being satisfied in each case. 
When we turn our attention to change over time we observe 
improvements in the reported satisfaction levels of the work-poor 
and work-rich groups with increases of 14 percentage points being 
reported in the first case and of 10 percentage points in the last 
case.  
Among partners while satisfaction levels increase across all three 
groups, this is particularly so for the partners in the work-poor 
households. As a consequence while such partners were clearly 
significantly less satisfied than partners in other households in 1994 
by 2000 they were the most satisfied group. In both years spouses 
in work-rich households were less satisfied with their leisure time 
than those in mixed-work and work-poor households. The gap 
between the groups widened in 2000 because those in work-poor 
and mixed-work households became more satisfied while the 
satisfaction levels of partners in work-rich households declined 
somewhat over time. These results provide some evidence of 
pressure on leisure time among female partners in households that 
have high paid and unpaid work commitments. However, the 
majority, 64 per cent still express satisfaction with their leisure time. 
Furthermore, despite the lower than average leisure satisfaction, 
women in this position express high levels of satisfaction with their 
work or main activity which suggests there may be a trade-off 
between different elements of life satisfaction for this group.   
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Table 4.14: Satisfaction with Leisure by Employment Status and 
Date of Survey for Couples with Children 
 1994 1994 2000 2000 
 % Satisfied % Satisfied % Satisfied % Satisfied 
 Reference 
Person  
Partner Reference 
Person  
Partner 
No work 61.9 48.5 76.0 80.9 
Mixed 61.4 70.4 68.3 76.6 
All work 60.7 63.3 70.8 65.3 
 
 In the foregoing analysis we saw that in one very important 
respect a reduction in the number of work-poor households was 
associated with an increasing polarisation between such households 
and others. This involved a striking increase in the proportion of 
such households below 50 per cent of median household income. 
This result is consistent with the finding reported in Chapter 2 that 
such households had become increasingly concentrated in the 
bottom income decile. This change has taken place in the context 
of a general increase in the numbers below this line but the burden 
has been disproportionately borne by work-poor households with 
consequent increases in the disparities between them and mixed 
and work-rich households. 
The risk of income poverty for work-poor households also 
increased at the 60 per cent and 70 per cent lines, so that by 2000 a 
staggering 91 per cent of these households fell below the 70 per 
cent poverty line. However, the decline in the number of work-
poor households noted in the earlier chapters coupled with general 
increases in the numbers below relative income poverty lines (due 
to increasing income inequality) has resulted in a situation whereby, 
except for the 50 per cent income line, work-poor households 
constitute a smaller proportion of the poor in 2000 than had been 
the case in 1994. Thus it is true that, at the same time as the 
position of work-poor households has become particularly 
precarious, exposure to income poverty, except in its most extreme 
form, has become a phenomenon that extends beyond such 
households to a substantially greater extent than heretofore.  
In order to evaluate the implications of these trends, it is 
necessary to take into account the less than entirely straightforward 
relationship between income and life-style deprivation and the fact 
that such changes took place in the context of an unprecedented 
increase in the overall level of prosperity in Irish society. When we 
focus on life-style deprivation, we find that, despite the 
deterioration in their relative income position, work-poor 
households experienced substantial reductions in their levels of 
basic and secondary deprivation. However, in the case of secondary 
deprivation their gains were substantially smaller than those 
achieved by other households. Thus a clear picture emerges of a 
pattern of gains for all three groups accompanied by a substantial 
polarisation in relative terms between work-poor households and all 
others. However, in a manner that at first glance may seem 
4.7 
Conclusions 
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paradoxical, these trends, combined with the change in the 
distribution of households across employment status categories 
over time, produced a situation whereby work-poor households 
came to make up a smaller proportion of those experiencing basic 
deprivation while the role of work-rich households increased in 
importance. 
Combining income and deprivation information we proceeded 
to examine the situation relating to consistent poverty. Here we 
found that at the 50 per cent line there was a substantial increase in 
the level of consistent poverty among work-poor households 
between 1994 and 2000 and a consequent widening disparity 
between themselves and all other households in exposure to such 
risk. At the 60 per cent line on the other hand there was little 
change either in the actual rates of poverty or the disparities 
between groups while at the 70 per cent line there was a substantial 
reduction in the poverty rate for the work-poor group. There 
appears, therefore, to be a degree of polarisation within the work-
poor group, with one-fifth of the group being pushed towards the 
rather extreme level of disadvantage represented by consistent 
poverty at 50 per cent of median income while at the same time 
three-quarters of the group avoid consistent poverty across all three 
income thresholds. As a consequence of these diverse trends the 
composition of the consistently poor shows little signs of change. 
When we turn to trends in subjective well-being, the major 
question is whether the reaction of the work-poor group is likely to 
be more strongly influenced by the absolute improvements in their 
life-style or the relative deterioration in their situation in terms of 
both income poverty and basic and secondary deprivation. The 
evidence relating to economic strain and psychological distress 
suggests that it is the former that has had the decisive impact as the 
work-poor group display a significant degree of improvement in 
their situation in relation to both dimensions, although in relation 
to the former the rate of improvement is somewhat less than that 
for other groups. Thus despite the significant deterioration in their 
relative position experienced by work-poor households there is no 
evidence that the position conforms to one of progressive 
immiseration. However, given the extent to which the deterioration 
of their relative position has involved them being pushed to the 
margins in relation to both income and secondary deprivation there 
must be considerable cause for concern as to what the 
consequences of such polarisation may be when the overall 
increases in prosperity levels are no longer present to buffer the 
impact of rising inequality.  
In concluding this chapter we redirected our attention to the 
potential problems faced by work-rich rather than work-poor 
households. We did so in the context of emerging arguments 
relating to the consequences of a deteriorating ‘work-life’ balance 
and the potential consequences of intensification of work. While 
the available data do not allow us to offer a comprehensive 
evaluation of such issues and, in particular, we have no data relating 
to quality of working conditions, we could find no evidence that 
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expanding employment opportunities and an increase in the 
number of work-rich households had resulted in decreasing 
satisfaction with either work or leisure activities. In fact where 
changes over time were observed, they were in the opposite 
direction. There was some evidence that in couple households with 
children female partners in work-rich households experienced lower 
levels of satisfaction with leisure time than those in mixed-
employment and no-employment, however, this was in the context 
of much higher satisfaction with their main activity. 
58 
5. THE DYNAMICS OF 
HOUSEHOLD JOBLESSNESS 
In this chapter we move from a cross-sectional view of household 
joblessness to a dynamic one. First we look at the duration of 
household joblessness and consider whether this is a temporary or 
more permanent condition of households. The persistence of 
joblessness is an important issue since it is likely that the longer 
households remain without employment the more severe the 
consequences. If households experience a long-term joblessness 
and welfare dependency the risks of income poverty and 
deprivation become higher as resources (such as savings) become 
depleted over time (Whelan et al., 2003). Another major concern 
about household joblessness is that individuals in these households 
will become increasingly detached from the labour market as their 
connections with social networks of employed people weaken. This 
suggests a “duration dependency” in other words the longer 
households remain disconnected from the labour market the more 
difficult it becomes to break back in. These factors suggest it is 
important to take account of the temporal dimension of household 
joblessness. 
The shift to a longitudinal perspective in this chapter involves 
the use of different analysis techniques, which are described in the 
methodology section below. In Section 3 of this chapter we develop 
a typology of household joblessness based on the number of years 
of work poverty and we consider the characteristics of those who 
experience persistent or recurrent work poverty. We then move on 
to examine transitions both to and from joblessness and the 
processes at the household level that account for these changes 
(Section 4). Here we consider the role of changes in household 
composition versus changes in employment in transitions to and 
from joblessness.  
In the final section we examine changes in the work patterns of 
couples and consider the role of women’s employment in 
household work transitions. We focus on these issues for two 
reasons. First, because there has been an emphasis in the literature 
on the link between the employment status of partners (see Chapter 
1). Second, we saw in Chapter 2 that a significant part of the 
employment growth experienced in the latter half of the 1990s was 
due to increases in women’s employment rate. We have shown 
elsewhere that the rise in employment was particularly dramatic 
among married women (Fahey et al., 2000). Therefore, we would 
5.1 
Introduction 
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expect changes in married women’s employment status to have had 
a significant impact on household work transitions.  
 
 In this chapter we make use of the panel element of the Living in 
Ireland Survey. Because the survey returned to the same individuals 
every year we are able to examine how their circumstances and 
characteristics changed over time. Here, we use this capability to 
examine the persistence of household joblessness, transitions to 
and from joblessness and how these patterns may be related to 
certain individual and household characteristics. However, as this 
approach requires that we follow individuals across time we have to 
confront some difficult issues presented by attrition in the sample 
that influence the types of analyses that can be performed.  
The first wave of the Living in Ireland Survey/European  
Community Household Panel (ECHP) was conducted in 1994, and 
the same individuals and households were followed, where possible, 
for each year thereafter. The wave conducted in 2000, therefore, 
was the seventh wave of the survey. In Wave 1 there were 4,048 
completed sample households and 9,904 members were interviewed 
individually. The follow-up rules for the survey meant that new 
households might be included in each wave where a sample person 
from Wave 1 moved to another household. Table A2.1 in Chapter 
2 summarises the wave-on-wave response rates, from Wave 1 to 
Wave 7.  
In 2000 a new sample of just over 1,500 completed households 
was added to the sample continuing from previous waves. Since we 
are concerned with longitudinal processes we do not use the new 
supplementary sample in this chapter but confine our analysis to 
households that were included in the earlier waves (1,952 
households with 4,745 individuals).  
Through the life of the panel individuals and households have 
been lost to the sample, or have failed to provide an interview in 
particular years. Such attrition causes “censoring” problems when 
carrying out longitudinal analyses since if information is not 
gathered after a certain date we do not know the outcomes of 
certain processes. For example, if someone is work-poor in 1995 
and 1996, but leaves the sample thereafter we do not know whether 
the jobless spell ended in 1996 or perhaps carried on through 1998. 
Such “right-censoring” is not difficult to take account of with the 
appropriate techniques and in a sense all data is censored because 
information stops at the final interview. But, such censored samples 
do demand complex weighting schemes to take account of the fact 
that certain cases may contribute more information than others 
simply because they stayed in the sample longer. The appropriate 
weighting technique in this situation is disputed c.f. (Enst, 1989; 
Lepkowski, 1989; Rendtel, 1991) and several different techniques 
are advocated.  
In Section 3 we restrict the analysis to households that were 
present for five or more of the seven years available (this section is 
based on year counts), one of which must be the first year of the 
5.2 
Methodology  
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panel (1994). We then weight this data using the cross-sectional 
weight for 1994. Tests showed that using households present for 5 
or more rather than 7 waves did not significantly alter the results, 
but did increase the numbers of households available in particular 
cells (thus increasing reliability). In the analysis of transitions, 
outlined in Section 4, we included all households who appeared in 
at least two waves of the panel.14  
 
 As argued at the outset, the consequences of household 
joblessness are increasingly serious the longer this situation lasts. 
Therefore, in this section we attempt to establish the degree to 
which household joblessness is a long-term condition. To do this 
we count the number of years over the period 1994 to 2000 that the 
household was work-poor. This gives us a measure of the 
persistence of joblessness over the period that will allow us to 
quantify the average experience and the distribution of work-poor 
years.   
As mentioned above we restrict the analysis to those households 
who were in the survey for at least five of the seven possible years. 
As in the previous chapters we limit the analyses to households 
with at least one individual aged between 18 and 65 years and where 
the household reference person is aged less than 65 years at first 
interview in 1994.  
On this basis we can now go on to examine the persistence of 
joblessness in the Living in Ireland sample. In Table 5.1 we can see 
the distribution of years work-poor across the households in the 
sample and this shows that a majority of households (58 per cent) 
avoided joblessness during the period from 1994 to 2000. However, 
this also means that a substantial minority of 42 per cent did 
experience joblessness during the period. This proportion is 
substantially more than either the 22 per cent found in 1994 or the 
lower figure of 14 per cent found in 2000 reported in Chapter 2.  
 
Table 5.1: Proportion of Households Experiencing N Years Work-
Poor 1994-2000 
Years Work-Poor % 
0 57.8 
1 12.2 
2 6.0 
3 5.1 
4 4.7 
5 4.6 
6 3.5 
7 6.1 
Total 100.0 
% Exp. 1+ Years 42.2 
Source: LII Survey 1994-2000; only households present in the survey for a 
minimum of 5 of the 7 waves are included.  
 
14 In Section 4 we are analysing ‘transitions’ from one year to the next and so only 
need to have at least two years for analysis. 
5.3 
The Persistence 
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This shows that over a longer observation period a far higher 
proportion of households have experienced joblessness than is 
revealed by cross-sectional figures. Moreover, of the 42 per cent of 
households who have experienced joblessness over the period from 
1994 to 2000, around 30 per cent have experienced two or more 
years and 19 per cent have experienced four or more years.   
Such statistics do not however tell the whole story. First of all, 
the use of a set observation period means that a household only 
reporting one year of joblessness in 1994 may in fact have been in 
the last year of a considerably longer spell (this is what is referred to 
as ‘left’ censoring).15 This is an important problem but, a report of 
more years work-poor over the period would still tend to indicate 
greater disadvantage. However, this problem also highlights another 
issue – that joblessness often occurs as a ‘spell’ rather than as single 
years. This is important since four years of joblessness over the 
seven observed may indicate a single period of sustained 
unemployment or recurrent spells. To address this issue we devised 
a typology of joblessness based on both the number of years work-
poor and the length of the spells: 
 
• Non-Work-
Poor: 
Households which did not experience 
joblessness over the seven year 
observation period. 
• Transient     
Work-Poor: 
Experienced one spell of joblessness, 
but not of more than two years. 
• Recurrently 
Work-Poor: 
Experienced two or more spells of 
joblessness, but none of more than 
two years. 
• Persistently 
Work-Poor: 
Experienced at least one spell of 
joblessness of three or more years. 
 
Table 5.2 shows the distribution of households across this 
typology. As in Table 5.1 we see that 58 per cent of households 
have avoided joblessness completely during the period, but 16 per 
cent have experienced a single spell (‘transient’ work-poor) and 5 
per cent have experienced two or more spells. Most interestingly 
however, almost 21 per cent have experienced at least a single spell 
of three or more years. Remember that households of retired 
people have been removed from the sample under analysis, so these 
‘persistently’ work-poor households represent working age 
households that were without a working adult for at least three 
years. 
 
 
 
 
15 Although here we refer to ‘spells’ of joblessness, in fact we only use annual 
information on the work status of household members at the time of the interview. 
It is possible then that the household has not been work-poor throughout the year. 
62 WORK-POOR HOUSEHOLDS  
 
Table 5.2: Proportion of Households by Work-Poor Typology 
1994-2000  
Never Work-Poor 57.8 
Transient Work-Poor 16.1 
Recurrently Work-Poor 5.3 
Persistently Work-Poor 20.8 
Total 100.0 
Note: Only includes households present in at least 5 of the 7 survey waves.  
 
So what types of households experienced these different forms 
of joblessness? Table 5.3 shows the composition of the different 
categories by household type and shows that just over a quarter of 
the persistently work-poor are single person households whilst 
almost another quarter are households consisting of a couple with 
one or more children under the age of 18 years. Households of 
single parents with children aged less than 18 years make up around 
16 per cent of the persistently work-poor. 
Table 5.3: Proportion of Households by Work-Poor Typology and Household Type 1994-
2000 
 Never 
Work-Poor 
Transient 
Work-Poor 
Recurrent 
Work-Poor 
Persistently 
Work-Poor 
One person <65 years 10.6 9.8 16.8 27.2 
Couple, both under 65 years 8.6 4.5 2.1 11.3 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 61.6 51.6 38.9 23.2 
Couple with children 18-29 years 6.3 9.4 8.4 6.7 
Lone parent, youngest <18 years 3.4 10.1 25.3 16.4 
Lone parent, children 18-29 years 1.8 4.5 4.2 6.2 
Multi-generation, children< 30 years 3.6 3.8 4.2 3.2 
Other 4.1 6.3 0.0 5.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: Only includes households present in at least 5 of the 7 survey waves.  
 
Looking at the composition of households experiencing 
recurrent joblessness, couples and single parents with children aged 
less than 18 are by far the largest group. Similarly, in terms of 
transient joblessness, couples with children aged less than 18 are by 
far the largest group. 
In part however, the composition of these categories could 
simply be a function of the prevalence of that household type in the 
population. Table 5.4 shows the risk that these household types 
face of household joblessness and reveals an interesting and rather 
different pattern. Here we see that single person and single parent 
households run the highest risk of being long-term work-poor with 
around 40 per cent of these groups being persistently work-poor. In 
contrast only 10 per cent of couples with children under the age of 
18 years experienced persistent joblessness. Very few of all the 
household types experienced recurrent joblessness, although lone 
parents with children under 18 years had a 16 per cent chance of 
doing so. The proportions of the different household types not 
experiencing joblessness is simply the corollary of the persistently 
work-poor figures and shows that couple based households are far 
less likely then single adult households to experience joblessness. 
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Table 5.4: Risk of Persistent Work Poverty by Household Type, 1994-2000 
 Never 
Work-Poor 
Transient 
Work-Poor 
Recurrent 
Work-Poor 
Persistently 
Work-Poor 
Total 
One person <65 years 42.9 11.0 6.3 39.8 100 
Couple, both under 65 years 61.0 8.9 1.4 28.8 100 
Couple, youngest child <18 years 70.1 16.4 4.1 9.5 100 
Couple with children 18-29 years 52.0 21.6 6.4 20.0 100 
Lone parent, youngest <18 years 23.5 19.5 16.1 40.9 100 
Lone parent, children 18-29 years 32.2 22.0 6.8 39.0 100 
Multi-generation, children< 30 years 57.8 17.2 6.3 18.8 100 
Other 51.9 22.2 0.0 25.9 100 
Note: Only includes households present in at least 5 of the 7 survey waves.  
 
It is striking that almost 21 per cent of all households and 40 per 
cent of single person and 30 per cent of couple households under 
65 years are persistently poor across a period of such enormous 
growth in the economy nationally when unemployment decreased 
by over 12 per cent. How can we explain this? At first glance one 
would imagine that these groups were in a prime position to claim 
jobs in the expanding economy. The answer to this question was 
suggested in Chapter 2 which showed that a large proportion of 
households that were work-poor contained adults who had low 
levels of education and this is even more true for the groups who 
are persistently work-poor. Further analyses of the LII data show 
 
Table 5.5: Characteristics of Persistently Work-Poor Households (in 
1994) 
 Persistently Work-
Poor 
All Other HHs 
 % % 
Ed level of HRP   
No Qualifications 69.7 32.3 
Intermediate Certificate Level 14.5 25.4 
Leaving Certificate Level 10.8 25.3 
Third Level 5.0 17.0 
Age of HRP   
Under 35 years 21.7 25.1 
35-44 years 20.7 33.6 
45-54 years 14.5 27.7 
55-64 years 43.2 13.6 
Social Class HRP   
Service Class 9.0 22.1 
Routine non-manual 4.5 10.4 
Self-employed 3.4 7.7 
Farmers 3.6 9.1 
Skilled Manual 23.5 20.4 
Unskilled Manual  56.0 30.3 
Health status of HRP   
No chronic health problems 60.4 88.4 
Chronic health problems 39.6 11.7 
   
Lone Parent 16.3 93.6 
Not lone parent 83.7 6.4 
   
 100.0 100.0 
Note: Only includes households present in at least 5 of the 7 survey waves. 
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that 70 per cent of persistently work-poor households have a 
reference person with no qualifications and 85 per cent have less 
than Leaving Certificate levels. Furthermore, 56 per cent of this 
group come from the unskilled manual working class and almost 
half were aged over 55 years in 1994. Perhaps more damaging for 
their work prospects, 40 per cent of the HRPs of persistently work-
poor households have chronic health conditions which limit their 
activities to some extent.16 
We can see more details on the difference in levels of 
disadvantage between households in Table 5.6 which shows that 
those households where the HRP has no qualifications having 
almost three times the chance of experiencing persistent joblessness 
compared to those where the HRP has at least a junior certificate. 
Those households where the HRP has at least a leaving certificate 
have almost a quarter of the chance of these households with no 
qualifications and those with a tertiary qualification less than a sixth 
of the chance. 
Table 5.6: Proportion of Households by Work-Poor Typology and 
Educational Qualifications of the HRP in 1994 
 Never 
Work-
Poor 
Transient 
Work-Poor 
Recurrent 
Work-
Poor 
Persistently 
Work-Poor 
Total 
No 
Qualifications 
 
40.9 
 
16.1 
 
6.8 
 
36.1 
 
100 
Junior 
Certificate 
 
62.6 
 
18.0 
 
7.0 
 
12.5 
 
100 
Leaving 
Certificate 
 
69.7 
 
16.1 
 
4.4 
 
9.8 
 
100 
Tertiary 80.3 12.2 1.2 6.3 100 
Note: Only includes households present in at least 5 of the 7 survey waves. 
 
There are similar, though not as pronounced gradients in the 
risks that the different qualification groups run of transient and 
recurrent joblessness, whereas the gradient is reversed, as we would 
expect, in terms of the risk of avoiding joblessness over the period. 
Table 5.7 shows that those households where the HRP was 
employed in 1994 ran a fraction of the risk of experiencing 
persistent joblessness compared to households where the HRP was 
unemployed, or particularly where the HRP was early retired or 
unable to work due to sickness or disability. The unemployed and 
ill/disabled households also run a high risk of experiencing both 
recurrent and transient joblessness compared to all other groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
16 In 11 per cent of work-poor households the HRP said this health problem 
severely restricted their daily activities or the type of work they could do, while 29 per 
cent said it restricted their activities to some extent. 
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Table 5.7: Proportion of Households by Work-Poor Typology and 
Employment Status of HRP 1994 
 Never 
Work-
Poor 
Transient 
Work-
Poor 
Recurrent 
Work-
Poor 
Persistently 
Work-Poor 
Total 
Employed 80.3 14.0 1.6 4.2 100 
Unemployed 16.9 23.2 16.9 42.9 100 
Ill/Disabled 6.8 17.6 16.2 59.5 100 
Retired Early 13.4 15.9 3.7 67.1 100 
Home Duties 20.9 19.1 8.2 51.8 100 
Note: Only includes households present in at least 5 of the 7 survey waves. 
 
 In the last section we examined the distribution of years of 
joblessness and saw that, although the majority of households 
whose members were of working age had at least one person 
working through the period from 1994 to 2000, a substantial 
minority of 42 per cent experienced at least one year of joblessness. 
More worryingly almost 21 per cent were persistently work-poor 
during this period and experienced a continuous spell of at least 
three years work-poor. In this section we attempt to tease out what 
factors explain transitions into and from joblessness at the 
household level and thus understand why some households remain 
jobless for long periods whilst others move out from joblessness 
more quickly. 
The members of work-poor households tend to be 
disadvantaged in a number of ways which make their entry into 
joblessness more likely and their exit less so; their members tend to 
have lower educational levels, are more likely to be a lone parents 
and generally have a larger number of factors that increase the risks 
of unemployment. Across all households, the retirement of a 
previously working household member can also increase the 
probability of experiencing joblessness, particularly if other 
members of the household are already unemployed or inactive. 
Overall then it is these general disadvantages that determine 
whether a household becomes or remains work-poor. However, a 
household can also become work-poor because an individual who 
was working left the household; this could happen because of a 
number of reasons such as the death of an individual, family break-
up, or because a younger member left home. Therefore, we have 
two general groups of factors that can explain why a household 
becomes work-poor: either a change in the number of workers 
through unemployment or retirement, or a change in the number of 
individuals in the household. Of course, these two ‘events’ can also 
occur together since if an individual who was previously working 
leaves the house, there will be one less person working.   
We can use the longitudinal nature of the Living in Ireland data 
to examine these routes into joblessness by following household 
‘transitions’ from year to year. As well as following the employment 
status of individuals in the household we can also keep track of 
whether individuals leave or enter the household, or whether they 
pass certain milestones such as reaching retirement age.  
5.4  
Movements To 
and From 
Joblessness 
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By looking at the prevalence of these events when households 
make a transition into or from joblessness we will be able to 
examine what factors are most important. Remember that our 
observations of households are yearly and so the events that we 
observe do not necessarily occur at the same time, but sometime 
within the same year. 
We begin the analysis of transitions by examining the two 
general groups of events separately, thus in Table 5.8 we see the 
proportions of transitions into and from (‘entry’ and ‘exit’) 
joblessness where the number of employees changed by different 
amounts. This shows that most households who became work-
poor did so because of the loss of a single worker in that year (69 
per cent), although a substantial 21 per cent lost two or more 
workers from the household in the preceding year. Interestingly, 
exits from joblessness were even more likely to occur because of 
the employment of a single person in the household as shown in 
the second column of Table 5.8 where 85 per cent of exiting 
households gained a single worker. 
Table 5.8: Proportion of Transitions into and From Work Poverty 
by Change in Number Employed 
No. Employed Enter Exit 
-3 or more 3.7 0.0 
-2 16.9 0.0 
-1 69.3 0.0 
  0 10.0 3.9 
+1 0.0 85.1 
+2 0.0 10.0 
+3 or more 0.0 0.9 
      Total 100.0 100.0 
Note: Includes households present in any two consecutive survey waves. 
 
What role does a change in the number of adults in the 
household have in these transitions and is it as substantial as that of 
employment transitions? Table 5.9 shows that such events do not 
seem to be as important with just 7 per cent of transitions into 
joblessness coincided with a decrease in those aged 18-64 in the 
household, while 9 per cent coincided with an increase in the 
number of adults of working age. On the other hand, a slightly 
more substantial 17 per cent of transitions out of joblessness 
coincided with an increase in the number of household members 
aged 18-64 years. 
Table 5.9: Proportion of Transitions into and From Work Poverty 
by Change in Number of People Aged 18-64 Years in 
the Household 
 Enter Exit 
Stayed Same 83.7 75.9 
Increased 9.3 16.6 
Decreased 7.0 7.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Note: Includes households present in any two consecutive survey waves.  
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We get confirmation of the greater importance of changes in the 
number working compared to the number of adults in Table 5.10 
which cross-classifies these different events and shows that over 82 
per cent of transitions into joblessness occur with a decrease in the 
number employed, though the number aged 18-64 years in the 
household remained stable. In fact only 2.2 per cent of transitions 
into joblessness occurred where the number employed stayed the 
same or increased and the number aged 18 years plus in the 
household decreased. If anything this pattern is even more 
pronounced for transitions from joblessness.  
Table 5.10: Proportion of Transitions Into and From Work- 
Poverty by Type of Change in Number of Employed 
and Number of Adults 
 Enter Exit 
Employed Decreasing & Number 18-64 years Same 82.3 0.0 
Employed Decreasing & Number 18-64 years Increasing 9.3 0.0 
Employed Decreasing & Number 18-64 years Decreasing 6.2 0.0 
Employed Same & Number 18-64 years Decreasing 1.5 0.0 
Employed Same & Number 18-64 years Same 0.7 0.5 
Employed Same & Number 18-64 years Increasing 0.0 0.5 
Employed Increasing & Number 18-64 years Decreasing 0.0 7.4 
Employed Increasing & Number 18-64 years Increasing 0.0 16.9 
Employed Increasing & Number 18-64 years Same 0.0 74.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
    Note: Includes households present in any two consecutive survey waves.  
 
 At the outset of this report we highlighted the fact that the 
literature on joblessness has paid particular attention to the link 
between the employment statuses of couples. Policy analysts have 
been interested in whether benefit systems discourage the wives of 
unemployed men from taking up paid employment. Others have 
suggested that changes in the employment patterns of couples have 
been crucial in the concentration of paid work in certain ‘work–
rich’ households in other countries (Greg and Wadsworth, 1996).  
Ireland too has seen a dramatic growth in women’s labour 
market participation. For example, (O'Connell, 2000, p. 61) has 
shown that women’s labour force participation rate grew by over 8 
percentage points or 187,000 between 1991 and 1999, compared to 
a fall of 0.7 per cent among men. Increases in participation have 
been most dramatic for married women (Fahey et al., 2000).17 The 
significance of changes in female employment for female headed 
households including lone parent households is self evident, 
however, it is less clear what the role of married women’s 
employment transitions has been in the decline of work-poor 
households over the late 1990s. 
 
17 In contrast, rates among single women declined between 1983 and 1995, with an 
increase between 1995 and 1998. This decline mostly reflected increasing 
educational participation among the younger age-group.   
5.5  
Coupled 
Transitions and 
The Role of 
Women’s 
Employment  
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Although married women may not be the main earner in the 
household, their contribution to household income may still be 
significant. In joint-earner couples women’s contribution tends to 
be lower than men’s because of lower pay and part-time working.18 
However, contrary to the assumption that increases in female 
employment have not improved household circumstances 
(O’Hearn, 1998), women’s earnings are often vitally important for 
the household and may mean the difference between being above 
and below the poverty line, particularly where the male partner is 
not working. Maitre et al. (2003) find that in couple households in 
Ireland the rate of poverty would more than double from 13 per 
cent to 30 per cent in the absence of the female partner’s earnings.    
Here, we focus briefly on the extent to which couples 
employment status is linked and then look at the role of married 
women’s employment in transitions to and from joblessness.  
We look first at the employment status of couples over the time 
period of interest in Table 5.11. The proportion of households that 
fit the traditional male breadwinner female homemaker 
arrangement has declined substantially in a short space of time from 
45 per cent in 1994 to one-third of couple households in 2000. In 
contrast, joint breadwinning increased from 35 per cent to over 50 
per cent in 2000 to become the norm for married couples. Indeed it 
became the dominant form of household work arrangement for 
couples by 1997. Joint non-employment declined steadily over the 
period consistent with the decline in household joblessness. Despite 
women’s increased employment, role reversal among couples has 
remained uncommon, remaining at under 5 per cent for the period.  
Table 5.11: Couples Employment Status 1994-2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Men emp. Women non-emp. 45.0 43.7 39.7 37.2 36.5 35.8 36.2 
Men emp. Women emp. 34.6 36.8 39.8 44.8 47.3 49.2 50.7 
Men non-emp. Women non-emp. 16.1 15.0 15.8 13.3 12.3 11.3 8.5 
Men non-emp. Women emp. 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.7 3.9 3.8 4.6 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: 2000 figures do not include new respondents, only those in original panel. 
 
It seems then that female employment has substantially 
increased the proportion of dual earner couples over the period 
from 1994 to 2000, but to what extent has the employment of 
women influenced the experience of joblessness at the household 
level? To examine the extent to which women’s employment moves 
lead to or from household joblessness we examine all household 
transitions both into and from joblessness and look at the extent to 
which these transitions were driven by the employment of a female 
partner, male partner or some other person in the household. As 
 
18 Analysis of the 1994 ECHP showed that in dual-earner couples women 
contributed an average of 38 per cent in Ireland, this compared with 36 per cent in 
the UK, 40 per cent in France and 42 per cent in Denmark.   
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explained earlier, however, even if no person in the household 
leaves employment, it is still possible for the household to become 
work-poor as a member may leave (or reach age 65). As we are 
looking at the employment of partners, we restrict our analysis to 
households with a male and female couple (aged less than 65 years). 
This group made up 51 per cent of households in 2000. The 
analysis is also restricted solely to those transitions where no 
member left the household since we are interested in the roles of 
the male and female partners in transitions to and from joblessness. 
Table 5.12 shows the results of this analysis and shows that, for 
the majority of transitions into joblessness (among this restricted 
group), it is the male partner’s transition either to unemployment or 
inactivity that is primary, with 57 per cent of all transitions into 
joblessness occurring where the male partner alone leaves 
employment. Changes in the male partner’s employment status are 
also involved in a further 9 per cent of transitions, though this time 
accompanied by simultaneous moves by other people in the 
household.19 
Table 5.12: Proportion of Transitions Into and From Work Poverty 
by Sex of Partner Making Transition  
(In two partner households where employment moves occurred) 
Male Partner Female Partner Other in HH Enter Exit 
Same Same Leaves Employ. 10.2 0.0 
Leaves 
Employ. 
Same Same 56.5 0.0 
Same Leaves Employ. Same 24.1 0.0 
Leaves 
Employ. 
Same Leaves Employ. 0.9 0.0 
Leaves 
Employ. 
Leaves Employ. Same 8.3 0.0 
Same Leaves Employ. Leaves Employ. 0.0 0.0 
Same Same Enters Employ. 0.0 20.8 
Enters Employ. Same Same 0.0 58.5 
Same Enters Employ. Same 0.0 18.3 
Enters Employ. Same Enters Employ. 0.0 2.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.12 shows, however, that changes in female partner’s 
employment is nonetheless important for transitions into 
joblessness accounting for almost a quarter of all such transitions 
and playing a part in a further 8 per cent. Interestingly, the loss of 
employment of ‘others’, be these children or some other relation 
are crucial in around 10 per cent of transitions. 
For exits from household joblessness, we find that 59 per cent 
of transitions were due to movements into employment by the male 
partner. The employment of ‘others’ in the household was 
instrumental in almost 21 per cent of transitions, while the entrance 
 
19 ‘Simultaneous’ is here used rather loosely as we are using yearly interview data 
and so the transition may actually have occurred at any point during the preceding 
year, although the individuals concerned will be employed or not employed at the 
time of interview. 
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of female partners into employment was critical in 18 per cent of 
moves. Although the male partner’s employment predominates, it is 
also clear that the employment of the female partner and moreover, 
others in the household also play a role in exits from joblessness. In 
these cases their earnings are likely to be crucial for the household 
since they will be the sole earner. In an additional 2.5 per cent of 
cases exits from joblessness for households involved both partners 
moving into employment.   
In terms of transitions into and from joblessness it seems that 
women’s role is subsidiary to that of the male partner in the 
household, but could it be that increases in female employment 
between 1994 and 2000 were greater in households where the male 
partner was already employed? If so, we could see women’s role 
being far more important in household transitions to being ‘work-
rich’. We can examine whether this is true in Table 5.13 which 
looks at the role of different people in moving households from a 
‘mixed-work’ position where some, but not all individuals aged 18 
to 65 years are employed, to one where everyone of this age group 
is employed. Table 5.12 confirms the importance of women’s 
employment in these moves, showing that 60 per cent of transitions 
into full-household employment occur because the female partner 
enters employment. This compares to just 11 per cent where the 
male enters employment and 26 per cent where another member of 
the household does so. 
Table 5.13: Proportion of Transitions To Being Work-Rich by Sex 
of Partner Making Transition  
(In two partner households where employment moves occurred) 
Male Partner Female Partner Other in HH Enter 
Same Same Leaves Employ. 3.3 
Enters Employ. Same Leaves Employ. 0.2 
Same Enters Employ. Leaves Employ. 0.2 
Same Same Enters Employ. 25.8 
Enters Employ. Same Same 10.7 
Same Enters Employ. Same 59.7 
Total  100.0 
THE INFLUENCE OF PARTNERS’ EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS 
We have seen that the employment of female partners is a 
significant influence on the experience of joblessness at household 
level, but do we see the mutual influence of partners’ employment 
status that has been observed in work elsewhere? (de Graaf and 
Ultee 2000; McGinnity, 2002; Cooke, 1987). Here we perform some 
preliminary analyses to examine this question using tabular 
methods, although of course it would be important to control for 
socio-demographic factors when carrying out a full analysis. 
Nonetheless, by restricting our sample to those couples where both 
partners are aged less than 65 years and examining transitions into 
and from work we will be able to perform a simple, but effective 
test of whether partners’ employment statuses influence one 
another. 
   THE DYNAMICS OF HOUSEHOLD JOBLESSNESS 71 
 
To test the hypothesis of the mutual influence of partners’ 
employment status we examined the probability of each partner 
making a transition both into and from non-employment (both 
unemployment and inactivity) conditional on the status of the other 
partner (the analyses are restricted to couples where both are aged 
less than 65 years). 
Table 5.14 gives the results of the analysis of transitions into 
work and shows clear differences between the probability of both 
male or female partners entering employment depending on 
whether their partner is employed or not. For male partners whose 
partners do not work, the average probability of entering 
employment across the six years is around 0.14 (although 
substantially higher in 1996-7 and 1999-00) whereas for males with 
employed partners the average probability is around 0.24 and there 
is evidence of an increasing trend across the period. Although the 
difference between women with and without employed partners is 
lower than among males, this same relationship also holds here. 
Although we have not controlled for a number of covariates such 
as age and socio-economic status that may impact on this 
relationship, it is still clear that partner’s employment statuses are 
important.  
Table 5.14: Year-on-Year Probability of Transition Into Work for Men by Employment Status 
of Partner 
 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 
Men with Emp. Partner 10.9 17.9 28.9 27.0 31.4 26.8 
Men with Non Emp. Partner 11.3 11.7 17.9 11.4 11.0 20.5 
Women with Emp. Partner 10.5 12.3 13.2 11.9 15.1 15.2 
Women with Non-Emp. Partner  6.2 4.0 8.4 6.2 7.1 11.2 
 
If we look at the probability of transition out of work by the 
status of the partner in Table 5.15, the difference between those 
with and without partners is not as large as in Table 5.14, but in all 
years those men with an employed partner are less likely to leave 
employment than those with a non-employed partner (all are 
statistically significant apart from 1999-00 at 5 per cent probability). 
Women with employed partners are also significantly less likely to 
become non-employed for the first four years of the period, but the 
difference disappears after 1998. 
Table 5.15: Year-on-Year Probability of Transition Out of Work by Employment Status of 
Partner 
 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 
Men with Emp. Partner 2.4 3.0 2.3 1.5 2.1 2.2 
Men with Non Emp. Partner 5.8 6.4 3.8 4.6 4.7 3.2 
Women with Emp. Partner 13.7 9.9 8.2 8.7 9.8 10.5 
Women with Non-Emp. Partner  17.6 26.9 11.8 20.3 9.8 9.7 
 
The results from Tables 5.13 and 5.14 suggest that partners’ 
employment statuses impact on one another over time and increase 
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the probability of transition either into or out of employment. 
Investigation of the mechanisms through which this may occur is a 
priority for future research. 
 
 
 Research on unemployment at the individual level has found that 
the financial and some of the social/psychological consequences 
become more serious the longer unemployment persists.20 This 
research has also established that the longer someone is 
unemployed the less likely he or she is to be re-employed even 
when a wide range of personal and labour market characteristics are 
controlled (Russell and O’Connell, 2001; Bernardi et al., 2000). The 
negative impacts of household joblessness outlined in earlier 
chapters are also likely to be reinforced the longer the household 
remains outside employment. Therefore, in this chapter we 
distinguish between households that experience more transient 
spells of work poverty from those who face long-term or recurrent 
joblessness. We found that 21 per cent of households experience 
the type of long-term joblessness (three years or more) likely to be 
associated with social exclusion. A further 5 per cent of households 
experienced recurrent joblessness.  
The longitudinal analysis also shed further light on the question 
of why some households have remained work-poor despite the 
rapid employment growth during the late 1990s. The risk of 
becoming, or remaining work-poor is not evenly spread across 
households. Lone parent and single person households are 
particularly vulnerable to persistent work poverty. This heightened 
risk for lone parent households remains even when the children 
reach working age, suggesting that labour market disadvantages 
persist for the children of lone parents. Households where the 
reference person was in the unskilled manual classes were over-
represented in the “persistently work-poor” category as were 
households headed by someone aged 55 to 64 years. Chronic health 
problems were also strongly correlated with persistent work poverty 
and households where the reference person was ill or disabled in 
the first wave of the survey were extremely likely to experience 
long-term household joblessness: 60 per cent of this group were 
persistently work-poor. Finally, persistent work poverty was 
strongly linked to the educational level of the household reference 
person. Seven in ten of such households were headed by someone 
with no qualifications and they were six times more likely to be 
persistently work-poor than households where the reference person 
had a third level qualification. These results suggest that it is 
primarily those with poor educational qualifications, older workers, 
lone parents, the disabled and those with chronic health problems 
 
20 Some research has found a non-linear relationship between duration of 
unemployment and psychological distress. This shows that after an initial decline, 
distress levels remain stable at this lower level (Warr, 1987).  
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who have found it most difficult to escape the problem of 
household joblessness despite the unprecedented increase in 
employment over the period studied. It is clear that these groups 
experience specific labour market disadvantages and therefore 
require additional support to assist transitions into the labour 
market. 21 
These results suggest that improving access to and completion 
of formal education is one of the key policy tools in preventing 
households becoming work-poor. However, since many of the 
adults in work-poor households are in older age groups, this will 
mean  access to appropriate adult education or training. Previous 
research has found that for lone parents access to flexible work and 
training opportunities, the availability of affordable childcare, the 
removal of benefit disincentives (around secondary benefits) are 
among the key supports needed to enter employment (Russell and 
Corcoran, 2000). 
Much of the increase in employment over the last decade has 
been among women, therefore this chapter investigated the role of 
women’s employment in transitions in household employment 
status. The importance of women’s employment status in lone 
parent households, which are mainly headed by women, is self-
evident, therefore we concentrated here on couple households. Our 
analysis showed that the loss of women’s employment was critical 
in 24 per cent of household moves into work poverty (and played a 
partial role in a further 8 per cent), while women’s entry to 
employment was linked to 18 per cent of exits from work poverty. 
These results confirm the important role of married/cohabiting 
women’s employment in maintaining household’s attachment to 
work, although the role of the male partner still dominates. The 
lower proportion of exits from work poverty instigated by female 
partners entering jobs is consistent with possible benefit 
disincentive effects. More evidence in this direction was also 
presented in the final two tables of the paper which showed that an 
unemployed partner was more likely to gain employment if their 
partner was employed and vice versa. We did not formally test for 
the presence of benefit disincentive effects or try to differentiate 
these from the impact of partners’ correlated characteristics, but the 
influence of one partner on the other was clear. The decline in the 
single male breadwinner model has important implications for the 
organisation of both unpaid and paid work within society (e.g. in 
creating a need for childcare and elder care to be provided outside 
the family) and for the operation of a benefit system that often 
assumes a traditional division of labour (Murphy, 2003). The 
economic boom in Ireland has seen a very substantial increase in 
female employment during the economic boom of the late 1990s 
 
21 For some of the group, employment may not be possible or desirable and in 
these cases income supports are the most crucial policy intervention to avoid 
poverty. 
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and this was reflected in the high proportion of moves into ‘work-
richness’ caused by the female partner entering employment.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the current study does not 
examine the quality and sustainability of the jobs entered by those 
exiting household work poverty. This factor will be crucial in 
determining whether the gains that workless households have made 
can be maintained within a period when we do not have the high 
levels of employment growth experienced in the 1990s.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
High levels of household joblessness became a matter of public 
concern in Ireland and elsewhere in Europe during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The concentration of unemployment and non-
employment within households meant that many of the 
unemployed did not have access to the protection and support 
afforded by living with someone in employment. This pattern of 
joblessness also has important implications for the scale of public 
support necessary to prevent poverty. For a given level of 
unemployment, a concentration of joblessness within households 
will require greater financing because income cannot be transferred 
within households between employed and unemployed individuals.   
In this study we have outlined the very significant negative 
implications of household joblessness for their members. Jobless 
households have significantly lower income levels and standard of 
living than households with an attachment to the work force, which 
means they are more vulnerable to both relative income poverty 
and consistent poverty. Our analyses have shown that in 2000 
workless households had a 64 per cent chance of falling below the 
50 per cent median income poverty line, 27 per cent lacked at least 
one basic deprivation item and 79 per cent lacked at least one 
secondary item. This combines to produce a 22 per cent risk of 
poverty using a  National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) type 
measure.22 We have also found that members of jobless households 
experience heightened levels of psychological distress and high rates 
of economic strain (Chapter 4). However, the level of  
psychological and subjective economic strain among work-poor 
households was found to have decreased since 1994 (see section on 
polarisation below). 
The report has outlined trends in household joblessness over a 
period of very strong economic growth in Ireland (1994 to 2000).  
We have identified households most vulnerable to joblessness and 
highlighted risk factors, we have also profiled households according 
to duration of joblessness and modelled the transitions in and out 
of work-poverty. In doing so, the study has addressed a number of 
key debates. First, we have focused on the issue of polarisation i.e. 
to what extent has there been a growth at both extremes of the 
 
22 Below 60 per cent median income plus lacking one basic item.  
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household work continuum, and is there a growing gulf between 
the situation of work-poor households and other households? 
Second, we have examined the questions who are the work-poor, 
and why have they remained detached from the work force despite 
substantial improvements in employment in the economy as a 
whole. A third, subsidiary theme in the report has been the debate 
on intensification of work within households focusing on the 
growth of work-rich households (i.e. where all adult members are 
employed). In this final chapter we summarise the evidence relating 
to these debates, we also explore the welfare implications of 
changes in household joblessness by focusing on key policy groups: 
families with children, lone parent households, older workers, those 
with poor educational qualifications, and single person households.  
 
 The notion of a polarisation in household employment situations 
was developed on the basis of the UK experience. There, it appears 
that those who benefited most from employment growth were 
households that already had at least one member in employment. A 
significant part of this trend was due to women married to 
employed men taking-up many of the new part-time opportunities 
that emerged in the UK economy in the 1990s. At the other end of 
the household work continuum were households whose family 
situation, welfare status or other labour market characteristics 
prevented them from taking advantage of the increases in  
employment. Furthermore, some of this group, e.g. lone parent 
households, were becoming more numerous and so the rate of 
household joblessness for British society as a whole remained stable 
despite economic improvements.  
The theme of growing inequality or polarisation during a time of 
plenty has also been prominent in some accounts of the Irish 
‘Celtic Tiger’. (O’Hearn, 1998; Coulter, 2003; Kirby, 2002). 
However, the reality has proved more complex than some of the 
rhetoric both in relation to workless households and to issues 
considered elsewhere such as earnings inequality and poverty 
(Nolan and Maître, 2000; Layte et al.,  2000).23 
Ireland shared with the UK some of the characteristics that 
might have been expected to produce similar trajectories in 
household joblessness for both countries. Both countries shared a 
high level of household joblessness in the late 1980s, our social 
welfare systems have a common reliance on household means-
testing which can reinforce joblessness among couples (Dex et al., 
 
23 Nolan and Maître (2000) show that while earnings inequality has indeed 
increased over the period 1987 to 1997, this change did not involve the lowest 
earnings falling behind the median nor a rise in the levels of low pay. In relation to 
poverty Layte et al. (2000) show that the percentage of households falling below 
relative poverty lines rose in the 1990s but this was in the context of very 
significant increase in real household incomes. Therefore, when non-monetary 
indicators of deprivation were measured, there was a significant decline in poverty.  
 
6.2 
 Growing 
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1995), and Ireland like the UK experienced an increase in lone 
parent households and single person households who are more 
prone to household work poverty (see Chapter 2). However, 
despite these similarities, the trends in household employment in 
Ireland outlined in this study, are rather different to those in the 
UK. 
In Ireland the rapid economic growth experienced in the 1990s 
translated into a significant decline in household joblessness 
between 1994 and 2000, falling from 22 per cent to less than 14 per 
cent. Moreover, this decline was evident across nearly all household 
types (the exception was non-familial, multi-person households). 
There was also a modest decline in the proportion of ‘mixed-work’ 
households where some members were employed, but this decline 
was concentrated in the latter part of the period, 1997 to 2000.  
Households in which all members were employed grew from 35 per 
cent to just over 50 per cent over the same time period, which is 
consistent with the major rise in female employment over this 
period. Therefore, while there was evidence of increasing multiple 
employment within households this did not occur at the expense of 
work-poor households. 
Another dimension of polarisation centres on the relative 
position of work-poor households compared to the rest of society.  
Is there evidence that the diminishing number of work-poor 
households have become more detached from the standard of 
living of society? On this issue the results are somewhat mixed. The 
risks of work-poor households falling below any of three poverty 
lines increased between 1994 and 2000, however, this was within 
the context of a general increase in the proportions falling below 
these lines. Therefore, there was no change in the differential risk 
of income poverty between work-poor and work-rich households at 
the 60 per cent and 70 per cent poverty lines, however, there was a 
widening of the differential risk at the 50 per cent poverty line.  
When we turn to the indicators of deprivation we observe some 
deterioration in the position of jobless households compared to 
other groups. Although there were gains for all groups, the 
reduction in life-style deprivation between 1994 and 2000 was much 
more substantial for the work-rich and mixed-work households 
than the work-poor. This difference was particularly noticeable for 
secondary deprivation, which includes access to items such as a car, 
leisure and social activities, and central heating.  
Our analyses of income also suggest an increased polarisation 
between jobless households and others. First, comparing the 
income of work-poor households in 1994 and 2000 (adjusting for 
prices) show that during this period of sustained increase in 
national prosperity there was no increase in purchasing power for 
the majority of jobless households, however, other households 
showed a significant upward shift in their real income. Second, our 
figures show that work-poor households have become increasingly 
concentrated in the bottom income decile. Poverty studies suggest 
that this growing division between the incomes of the employed 
and non-employed has occurred because increases in social welfare 
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payments have not kept pace with the rapid rises in earnings (Layte 
et al., 2001b, pp. 17-18).  
Using the NAPS measure of consistent poverty which combines 
income and deprivation indicators we see that work-poor 
households have fallen behind on the strictest measure (<50 per 
cent median) but their position remains stable on the 60 per cent 
and 70 per cent lines. Therefore, we observe a polarisation within 
work-poor households with an increasing proportion being 
included in the most extreme category alongside an increasing 
group who avoid consistent poverty across all three thresholds.   
Finally our investigation of subjective well-being among the 
work-poor found that the proportions experiencing economic 
strain and psychological distress decreased significantly between 
1994 and 2000. The decline in psychological distress was similar to 
that for other households over the same time period, but the 
decline in economic strain, although substantial (-33 per cent) was 
less than the decline for other households (-50 per cent). These 
results suggest that absolute improvements in life-style outweigh 
deterioration in relative position in determining subjective well-
being among those in work-poor households. However, the 
consequences of the polarisation in the economic position of the 
work-poor for subjective well-being is likely to worsen when  
increases in the overall levels of prosperity are no longer providing 
a buffer. 
Overall then, while jobless households have become less 
common in Ireland since 1994, there is evidence that the economic 
position of these households has fallen behind others in society in 
some respects. This may be partly a selection effect, in that as more 
and more people are drawn into the labour market it is those who 
are most disadvantaged who are left behind. The most important 
dimension of this polarisation is that the income of this group has 
not kept pace with households where there are some adult 
members in employment, although the general rise in the standard 
of living has reduced non-monetary deprivation even for this 
group. So far this has not lead to a deterioration in the subjective 
well-being of jobless households. There is also evidence of a 
polarisation of economic position within workless households, our 
longitudinal analyses suggest that there is a division between those 
who experience long-term joblessness and those for whom the 
experience is more transitory. Preventing households falling into 
persistent joblessness may therefore be a necessary strategy for 
bridging this growing gap.   
 
 While household joblessness has declined significantly there are 
clearly some households who remain work-poor. Our study has 
shown a number of groups among the working-age population that 
are vulnerable to the risk of household work poverty: 
• Those aged 55-64; 
• Lone parents; 
• Those without educational qualifications; 
6.3 
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• Those with a chronic health problem or disability; 
• Those in the unskilled manual class; 
• Those in single person households.  
Although the risk of work poverty has decreased over time for even 
these groups between 1994 and 2000, they still have a higher 
probability of being in this situation than other households. Our 
longitudinal analysis also showed that they were also likely to be 
persistently work-poor (i.e. for three consecutive years or longer). 
This suggests that once jobless they experience greater difficulty in 
exiting this state. For a number of these groups their higher risk is 
partly associated with household structure. Lone parents and those 
in single person households are by definition reliant on the 
economic status of one adult, and will fall into work poverty if that 
one person is non-employed or unemployed. It is also clear that 
many of these groups face additional labour market difficulties 
which has prevented them from benefiting from the employment 
growth witnessed over the period 1994 to 2000.  
Other groups have a lower than average risk of work poverty 
but because they represent a large group among the working-age 
population, their presence among jobless households remains 
significant. One such group are couple households with children under 18. 
In the following section we focus on these vulnerable groups and 
draw out the implications of our findings for each one, and 
consider the supports needed to assist their transition into the 
labour market where appropriate. 
 
 The declining incidence of joblessness among households with 
members of working age has been a very significant bonus of the 
recent economic boom. Since poverty is strongly linked to 
household work status this change indicates a substantial 
improvement in the economic welfare of those households who 
have made this transition. This change also has significant 
implications for social welfare spending. Jobless households are 
shown to be highly dependent upon social welfare income; in 2000, 
85 per cent of their disposable income came from this source 
whereas in mixed-work and work-rich households such transfers 
made up only 13 per cent and 7 per cent of income respectively. 
Therefore, this shift in household work-status over time has 
reduced welfare dependency among the working age population. 
The changing employment situation has also led to a shift in the 
nature of payments to work-poor households. Unemployment 
payments have declined in significance while lone parent payments 
and sickness/disability related payments have become more 
important. This change in the type of transfers is indicative of the 
selection effect suggested earlier. In the following discussion we 
focus on the groups identified as having a high risk of household 
joblessness or who make up a significant proportion of the work-
poor and draw out the implications of our findings for each of 
these groups.  
 
6.4 
 Welfare and 
Policy 
Implications of 
Changing 
Household 
Work Patterns  
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FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 
The proportion of children living in work-poor households  
declined dramatically from 27 per cent in 1994 to 9 per cent in 
2000. This is a very positive development towards meeting policy 
targets of reducing child poverty. As a proportion of work-poor 
households couples with children under 18 years dropped from 30 
per cent to 14 per cent over the same time period. Couples with 
children had a below average risk of household joblessness in both 
1994 and 2000, and were found to be the group least likely to have 
experienced work poverty over the seven year period: 70 per cent 
had never been jobless. Ten per cent of these families fall into the 
most excluded category, who have experienced persistent work 
poverty for three or more successive years. However, because this 
is the most common household type among those of working age 
(see Table 2.2) they still account for almost one in four of 
persistently work-poor households. This group therefore remain a 
concern from a poverty perspective. The female partners in these 
couples may also be subject to work disincentives, there is some 
evidence of this in our finding that moves out of household 
joblessness in couple households are predominantly due to the 
husband entering employment, while women’s employment mainly 
caused moves from the mixed-work to work-rich category.   
LONE PARENTS 
Children in lone parent households are much more vulnerable to 
household work poverty. In 1994, 70 per cent of these households 
had no member in employment in 1994, but by 2000 the 
proportion had fallen to 41 per cent. This increase in employment 
among lone parents has not resulted in a equivalent decline in 
welfare dependency at the aggregate level (DSCFA, 2000). The 
earnings disregard attached to the One Parent Family Payment 
means that many of these working parents will still be claiming 
some benefit while others will be in supported employment 
through the Community Employment (CE) scheme.24 Figures in 
Chapter 3 showed that of the minority of work-rich households in 
receipt of benefits, over a third (36 per cent) were claiming lone 
parent benefits. 
The extent to which lone parent’s employment represents a 
route out of poverty for their households is also dependent on the 
quality and sustainability of those jobs. The results for the sample 
as a whole suggest that full-household employment is a very 
effective defence against household poverty: less than 4 per cent fall 
below the 50 per cent median poverty line and only 9 per cent have 
less than 70 per cent of median household income. However, the 
continued reliance on Community Employment schemes which are 
of limited duration, and the combination of low earnings potential 
 
24 Those on temporary employment schemes are included among the employed in 
our analyses.  
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and high childcare costs, councils against complacency about the 
long-term well-being of employed lone parents. Our longitudinal 
analyses showed that lone parents run a relatively high risk of 
recurrent joblessness (16 per cent compared to 5 per cent for the 
sample as a whole) which suggests that the jobs entered are often 
not sustainable  
Despite increases in employment among lone parent 
households, this group still remain the most vulnerable to 
joblessness: 41 per cent have no adult in employment and if we 
extend the definition of work poverty to those who have mean 
household working hours of less than 10 per week this rises to 45 
per cent. These households still accounted for 22 per cent of work-
poor households in 2000. Furthermore, this joblessness is not 
transitory. Around 40 per cent of this group experienced persistent 
poverty, which means their households were without anyone in 
employment in at least three consecutive years. 
OLDER WORKERS  
Chapter 2 showed that the new employment opportunities were 
disproportionately taken up by younger households, so that 
households where the household reference person (HRP) was over 
45 experienced a smaller than average decline in joblessness 
between 1994 and 2000. This meant that by 2000, households 
where the HRP was aged 55 to 64 years accounted for 39 per cent 
of jobless households up from 28 per cent in 1994. The 
longitudinal analyses also showed that those aged 55 to 64 years 
were particularly vulnerable to persistent work poverty. In addition 
to the immediate income and poverty implications, this growing 
concentration of joblessness among older age groups also has 
serious longer term consequences, since the pension system tends 
to reproduce and reinforce inequalities among the working age 
population (e.g., Ginn and Arber, 1998; Layte et al., 1999).   
DISABLED AND THOSE CHRONIC HEALTH PROBLEMS 
Our study found that households where the reference person was 
unable to work due to illness or disability in wave one of the survey 
had a high risk of having no other person in the household in 
employment and remaining in work poverty for a long period. Sixty 
per cent of this group were found to be persistently work-poor, and 
only 7 per cent managed to avoid work poverty completely over the 
seven waves of the survey. Furthermore, it was found that in 40 per 
cent of persistently work-poor households the reference person’s 
activities were limited by a chronic physical or mental health 
problem (11 per cent severely limited, 29 per cent somewhat 
limited). The significance of long-term illness/disability for 
household joblessness is also reflected in the finding that sickness 
or disability benefits accounted for the biggest share of welfare 
income among work-poor households in 2000. It is clear that the 
disabled and chronically ill can face a number of barriers to 
participation in the labour market including discrimination, lack of 
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flexible employment opportunities, lack of appropriate facilities in 
the workplace, problems of access to education and training (e.g. 
Grammenos, 2003). For those whose activities are severely 
restricted, unsupported employment may not be possible. However, 
for those who wish to participate, public policies need to tackle 
these barriers (Commission on the Status of People with 
Disabilities, 1997). Further research is also needed to establish the 
reasons why other household members are not in employment e.g., 
benefit disincentives, caring responsibilities, etc., and to devise 
policies that address these issues.   
THOSE WITHOUT EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 
This study has highlighted the central role of low education in 
increasing vulnerability to household joblessness. In 1994 the risk 
of household joblessness was eight times higher for households 
where the household reference person (HRP) had no qualification 
than for those headed by someone with third level education. 
Despite the significant rise in employment this association remained 
almost as strong in 2000 (when the ratio was 7.4). The beneficial 
effects of educational qualifications emerged for all household types 
including those experiencing other labour market disadvantages 
such as lone parent households. For example in 2000, 23 per cent 
of lone parents with third level education were jobless compared to 
57 per cent of those with no qualifications. This is partly because 
those with higher education will be better able to replace benefit 
income because they can command higher wages. Education was 
also important in increasing households’ chances of being work-
rich. Among couples with children, almost two-thirds (65 per cent) 
of those where the HRP had a third level qualification were work-
rich compared to  less than a quarter of households where the HRP 
had no qualification. 
The role of education in preventing household work poverty is 
also evident from our longitudinal research. Households where the 
reference person had no qualification were six times more likely to 
be persistently work-poor than those where the reference person 
had a third level qualification.  
These results suggest that improving access to and completion 
of formal education is a key policy tool in preventing households 
becoming work-poor. Since many of the adults in work-poor 
households are in older age groups, this will mean second-chance 
education or appropriately designed and targeted training. The 
recent NESF study on older workers makes a number of 
recommendations for re-integrating older unemployed and non-
employed workers (NESF, 2003, p.60). Research by Russell et al. 
(2001) addresses the training and education needs of women 
returners. 
SINGLE PERSON HOUSEHOLDS 
The single person household is of policy interest because this is 
becoming a more common living arrangement. This group are also 
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more vulnerable to household joblessness and poverty because 
there is no other member to provide financial support in the event 
of unemployment or non-employment. Those living alone may also 
lack additional emotional and non-financial support which may 
contribute to social exclusion. Our analysis found that joblessness 
among single person households declined from 37 per cent to 28 
per cent over the period 1994 to 2000. However, this group 
retained the second highest risk of being work-poor. Single person 
households were also the most vulnerable to persistent work-
poverty (i.e. three or more years of joblessness), which has serious 
implications for their poverty and psychological well-being. The 
number of working age people (25-64 years) living in one-person 
households increased by 46,000 between 1981 and 1996. Within the 
context of the economic boom this change did not dampen the fall 
in household joblessness, however, should  unemployment increase 
significantly in the future this change in household composition will 
have implications for the ability of households to support 
themselves during periods of unemployment and for the level of 
state support needed to prevent poverty. 
 
 While much of this report has focused upon the decline in the 
proportion of work-poor households, the substantial increase in 
work-rich households is also of social and policy significance. Our 
analyses show that the proportion of households where all adults of 
working age are employed has increased very significantly in the 
latter half of the 1990s. This is not simply due to the growth in the 
number of single adult households, although this demographic 
change does contribute to the overall pattern. The increase in full 
household employment was observed for every household type.  
The most significant increases however occurred among 
households with children under the age of 18 years (see Table 6.1). 
The increase for couple households with children was 70 per cent 
while for lone parents it was over 120 per cent.   
Table 6.1: Increase in Work-Rich Households by Household Type, 
1994 and 2000 
 Work-Rich  % 
 1994 2000 Change Change 
 % %   
1 person < 65 years 62.9 71.9 +9.0 +14.3 
Couple, both <65 years 54.2 67.4 +13.2 +24.4 
Couple, youngest child < 18 years 28.7 48.8 +20.1 +70.0 
Couple with adult children  14.1 20.7  +6.6 +46.8 
Lone parent, youngest child <18 years 21.8 48.3 +26.5 +121.6 
Lone parent, adult children 18.9 25.4 +6.5 +34.4 
Multi-generation, children < 30 years 13.4 18.9 +5.5 +41.0 
Other 49.2 39.7 -9.5 -19.3 
Total 34.9 49.3 +14.4 +41.3 
 Figures based on Table 2.4. 
 
The increase in full-household employment in both these cases 
is driven by changes in women’s employment status. The vast 
6.5 
Intensification 
of Work Within 
Households 
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majority of lone parent households with children under 18 years are 
headed by women (92 per cent) so their employment status 
determines that of their household. Our analyses of transitions 
from mixed-work to work-rich. among couples, showed that 60 per 
cent of these moves were due to the female partner (re)entering 
employment.  
The analysis of working hours also adds to our understanding of 
work-rich households. We saw that there has been an increase in 
the proportion of households in which the average number of paid 
work hours per person per week was over 30 hours (from 30 per 
cent to 40 per cent). However, the proportion working over 40 
hours per week increased by only three percentage points, and there 
was no change in the proportion of households where the average 
was 45 hours or more. This suggests an increase in multiple full-
time employment but not a concentration of very long working 
hours within households. Again the greatest increases in working 
hours were observed among lone and couple parents with children 
under 18 years, although the households most likely to have long 
working hours (over 40 hours) were still single person households 
and couple-only households.  
The increase in paid work among those with caring 
responsibilities raises the possibility of increased time-pressure and 
stress among members of these households and a deterioration in 
work-life balance. In other words, work-poverty may have been 
exchanged for time-poverty. To explore this issue we examined the 
subjective well-being among those in fully-employed households. In 
general, we find little evidence that the increase in the number of 
work-rich households has lead to increased psychological strain or 
to reduced satisfaction with leisure time or with ‘employment/main 
activity’. On all of these subjective measures the household 
reference person in work-rich households recorded slightly more 
positive responses than those in mixed-work households, including 
evaluations of leisure time. This remained true even when we 
focused on couples with children under 18 years who are likely to 
have additional caring and unpaid work demands. Furthermore, the 
level of satisfaction with work situation and leisure time expressed 
by the HRP in work-rich households increased over the period 
1994 and 2000.   
We might expect however that the ‘double burden’ of paid and 
unpaid work in such households would be more evident among the 
female partners. Among this group we find that satisfaction with 
leisure has remained stable over time but is lower than for partners 
in work-poor and mixed-work household. This suggests time-
pressure is an issue for some of these women. Nevertheless, this 
group are more satisfied with their main activity than those in 
work-poor and mixed-work households, with 86 per cent 
expressing satisfaction. Therefore, there is little sense from this 
limited investigation that people are being pushed unwillingly into 
the labour market.  
The possibility remains that there are sub-groups who are 
experiencing excessive time-demands (e.g., both partners full-time 
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with young children, or those experiencing work intensification in 
their jobs). The current data does not contain the information on 
unpaid workloads or working conditions to allow a comprehensive 
evaluation of these issues, however, the general analysis does not 
support a pessimistic reading of the rise in work-rich households.   
Nevertheless, the changes in the employment status of  
households with children have important implications for the 
organisation of both paid and unpaid work in society. Working 
mothers and fathers without a stay-at-home partner require 
different work arrangements and supports than those needed to 
facilitate more traditional households. These include employer 
policies such as flexible working hours, working from home, part-
time hours and governmental policies such as leave schemes for 
parents, and policies to re-integrate those who wish to return to the 
labour market e.g., access to training and education for returners 
(see Russell et al., 2002). These changes in household employment 
also increase demand for childcare and elder care services. The 
current level of public support for working parents in Ireland is 
poor compared to other countries in the EU. The level of public or 
subsidised childcare places is very low (Network on Childcare, 
European Commission (1996)) and consequently childcare costs are 
second highest in the Union (Ditch et al., 1998). Ireland is now one 
of the minority of EU countries without any statutory paternity 
leave and is one of only six EU15 countries where parental leave is 
unpaid (O’Brien and Shemilt, 2003; Department of Justice Equality 
and Law Reform, 2002). These supports are particularly important 
to the increasing number of employed lone parent households, who 
do not have the option of sharing caring responsibilities and 
domestic work within the household. Increasing employment 
opportunities for both men and women remains a central focus of 
the Irish and EU policy,25 government, employers and households 
themselves will need to adjust to reflect this social change that is 
already well underway.  
 
25 In the employment action plans there is a target of 60 per cent employment rate 
for women by the year 2010.  
86 
REFERENCES 
BERNARDI, F. R. LAYTE, A. SCHIZZEROTTO, S. JACOBS, 2000. “Who Exits 
Unemployment? Institutional Features, Individual Characteristics and Chances of 
Getting a Job: A Comparison of Britain and Italy” in D. Gallie and S. Paugam (eds.), 
Welfare Regimes and the Experience of Unemployment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
BLOSSFELD, H. P. and S. DROBNIC, 2001. Careers of Couples in Contemporary Societies: From 
Male Breadwinner to Dual Earner Families, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
BRANNEN, J. and P. MOSS, 1998. “The Polarisation and Intensification of Parental 
Employment in Britain: Consequences for Children, Families and the Community”, 
Community, Work and Family, Vol. 1,  No. 3, pp. 229-247. 
CALLAN, T., B. NOLAN and C.T. WHELAN, 1993. “Resources, Deprivation and the 
Measurement of Poverty”, Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 141-172. 
CALLAN, T., B. NOLAN, C.T. WHELAN, and J. WILLIAMS, 1996. Poverty in the 1990s: 
Evidence from the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, Dublin: Oak Tree Press. 
COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, 1997. A Strategy 
for Equality: Report of the Commission on the Status of People with Disabilities, Dublin: 
Government Publications. 
COOKE, K., 1987. “The Withdrawal from Paid Work of the Wives of Unemployed Men: A 
Review of Research”, Journal of Social Policy, Vol.16, pp. 371-382. 
COOPER-GREEN, E. J. 2001. “The Relationship Between Work-rich and Workless 
Households”, Labour Market Trends, December 2001, pp. 547-555. 
COULTER, C., 2003. “The End of Irish History? An Introduction to the book”, in C. 
Coulter, and S. Coleman (eds.), The End of Irish History? Critical Reflections on the Celtic Tiger, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.   
DAVIES, R., P. ELIAS and R. PENN, 1992. “The Relationship Between a Husband’s 
Unemployment and His Wife’s Participation in the Labour Force”, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 145-171.  
DAWKINS, P., P. GREGG, P. and R. SCUTELLA, 2002. Employment Polarisation in Australia, 
CMPO Working Paper Series, No, 02/50, University of Bristol. 
de GRAAF, P. and W. C. ULTEE, 2000. “United in Employment, United in 
Unemployment? Employment and Unemployment of Couples in the European Union 
in 1994” in  
D. Gallie and S. Paugam (eds.), Welfare Regimes and the Experience of Unemployment in Europe, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
DELOITTE & TOUCHE and A. MURPHY 1998. Review of Community Employment 
Programme, Final Report to the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 
Dublin. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM, 2002. Report of the 
Working Group on the Parental Leave Act 1998, Dublin: Stationery Office.  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL COMMUNITY AND FAMILY AFFAIRS, 2000. Review of 
the One-Parent Family Payment,  Programme Evaluation Report No. 7.  
DEX, S., S. GUSTAFFSSO, N. SMITH and T. CALLAN, 1995. “Cross-national 
Comparisons of the Labour Force Participation of Women Married to Unemployed 
Men”, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 47, pp. 611-635. 
DITCH, J., H. BARNES, J. BRADSHAW, and M. KILKEY, 1998. European Observatory on 
National Family Policies: A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1996, York: University of 
York, Social Policy Research Unit.  
   CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 87 
 
DROBNIC, S. and H. P. BLOSSFELD, 2001. “Cross-National Comparisons” in H.P. 
Blossfeld and S. Drobnic (eds.), Careers of Couples in Contemporary Societies, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
 
 
ENST, L. R., 1989. “Weighting Issues for Longitudinal Household and Family Estimates” in 
D. Kasprzyk et al. (eds.), Panel Surveys, John Wiley and Sons, New York, pp. 139-158. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION NETWORK ON CHILDREN, 1996. A Review  of Services for 
Young Children in the European Union, Brussels. 
EUROSTAT, 2002 “More Women than Men Living in Workless Households”, Statistics in 
Focus, Population and Social Conditions, 15/2002. 
 FAHEY, T. and H. RUSSELL, 2001. Family Formation in Ireland: Trends, Data Needs and 
Implications, ESRI Policy Research Series, No. 43, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute.  
FAHEY, T., H. RUSSELL and E. SMYTH, 2000. “Gender Equality, Fertility Decline and 
Labour Market Patterns Among Women in Ireland,” in B. Nolan, P. J. O'Connell and  
C. T. Whelan (eds.), Bust to Boom?: The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality, Dublin: 
Institute of Public Administration, p. 244. 
FISCHER, K., 2002. “Use of Time and Quality of Life” in R. Layte (ed.), An Illustrative Report 
on Quality of Life Indicators, Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions. 
GALLIE, D., 2002. “The Quality of Working Life in Welfare Strategy”, in G. Esping-
Andersen, Why We  Need a New Welfare State,  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
GINN, J. and S. ARBER, 1998. “Pension Penalties: The Gendered Division of Occupational 
Welfare”, Work, Employment and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 47-70. 
GRAMMENOS, S., 2003. Illness, Disability and Social Inclusion, Dublin: European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.  
GREGG, P. and J. WADSWORTH, 1996. “More Work in Fewer Households?,” in J. Hills 
(ed.), New Inequalities: The Changing Distribution of Income and Wealth in the United Kingdom, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 181-207. 
HAN, S.K. and P. MOEN, 2001. Coupled Careers: Pathways Through Work and Marriage in 
the United States, in H.P. Blossfeld and S.  Drobnic (eds.), Careers of Couples in 
Contemporary Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
IRWIN, S. and L. MORRIS, 1993. “Social Security or Economic Insecurity? The 
Concentration of Unemployment (and Research) Within Households”, Journal of Social 
Policy, Vol. 22, pp. 349-372. 
JARVIS, H., 1997. “Housing, Labour Markets and Household Structure: Questioning the 
Role of Secondary Data Analysis in Sustaining the Polarization Debate”, Regional Studies, 
Vol. 31, No. 5, pp. 521-531. 
JARVIS, S. and S. P. JENKINS, 2000. “Low Income Dynamics in 1990s Britain” in D. Rose 
(ed.), Researching Social and Economic Change: The Uses of Household Panel Studies, London: 
Routledge. 
KIRBY, P., 2002. The Celtic Tiger in Distress: Growth with Inequality in Ireland,  Hampshire: 
Palgrave.  
LAYTE, R., T. FAHEY, and C. T. WHELAN, 1999. Income, Deprivation and Well-Being Among 
Older Irish People, Dublin: National Council on Ageing and Older People. 
LAYTE, R., B. NOLAN, and C. T. WHELAN, 2000. “Trends in Poverty” in B. Nolan, P.J. 
O’Connell, and C. T. Whelan (eds.), Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and 
Inequality, Dublin: IPA.  
LAYTE, R. and P. J. O'CONNELL, 2001. Moving On? The Dynamics of Unemployment in Ireland 
in the 1990s, Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency.  
 POOR HOUSEHOLDS  
  
LAYTE, R., B. MAÎTRE, B. NOLAN, D. WATSON, C. T. WHELAN, J. WILLIAMS, and 
B. CASEY, 2001a. Monitoring Poverty Trends and Exploring Poverty Dynamics in Ireland, ESRI, 
Policy Research Series No. 41, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
LAYTE, R., B. MAÎTRE, B. NOLAN, and C. T. WHELAN, 2001b. “Explaining Levels of 
Deprivation in the European Union”, Acta Sociologica, Vol. 44, No. 2: pp. 105-112.  
 
 
 
LEPKOWSKI, J. M., 1989. “Treatment of Wave Non-Response in Panel Surveys” in D. 
Kasprzyk et al. (eds.), New York: Panel Surveys, John Wiley and Sons, pp. 274-348. 
McGINNITY, F., 2002. “The Labour-force Participation of the Wives of Unemployed Men: 
Comparing Britain and West Germany Using Longitudinal Data,” European Sociological 
Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 pp. 473-488.  
MAÎTRE, B., C. T. WHELAN and B. NOLAN, 2003. Female Partner’s Income Contribution to the 
Household Income in the European Union, EPAG Working Paper 43, Colchester: University 
of Essex. 
MUFFELS, R. A., 2000. “Dynamics of Poverty and Determinants of Poverty Transitions: 
Results from the Dutch Socio-economic Panel”, in D. Rose (ed.), Researching Social and 
Economic Change: The Uses of Household Panel Studies, London: Routledge. 
MURRAY, C. A., 1990. The Emerging British Underclass, London: I.E.A. 
MURPHY, M., 2003. A Woman’s Model for Social Welfare Reform, Dublin: National Women’s 
Council of Ireland. 
NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGY, 1997. Sharing in Progress: National Anti-Poverty 
Strategy,  Dublin: Government Publications Office. 
NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGY, 1999. Social Inclusion Strategy: 1998/1999 
Annual Report of the Inter Departmental Committee, Dublin: Government Publications Office. 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FORUM, 2003. Labour Market Issues for Older 
Workers, Forum Report No. 26, Dublin: NESF. 
NOLAN, B. and C. T. WHELAN, 1996. Resources, Deprivation and Poverty, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.  
NOLAN, B. and B. MAÎTRE, 2000. “Income Inequality”, in B. Nolan, P.J. O’Connell, and 
 C. T. Whelan, (eds.), Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality, Dublin: 
IPA.  
O’BRIEN, M. and I. SHEMILT, 2003. Working Fathers: Earning and Caring, Manchester: Equal 
Opportunities Commission, Research Discussion Series. 
O'CONNELL, P. J., 2000. “The dynamics of the Irish Labour Market in Comparative 
Perspective,” in B. Nolan, P. J. O'Connell, and C. T. Whelan (eds.), Bust to Boom?: The 
Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality,  IPA, Dublin, pp. 58-89. 
O’CONNELL, P. J., F. McGINNITY and H. RUSSELL 2003. “Working-time Flexibility in 
Ireland”, in J. O’Reilly (ed.), Regulating Working-Time Transitions in Europe. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
OECD, 1988. “Women’s Activity, Employment and Earnings: A Review of Recent 
Developments”, Employment Outlook, Paris: OECD.  
OECD, 1994. “Unemployment and Related Welfare Benefits,” in The OCED Jobs Study: 
Evidence and Explanations Part II, Paris: OECD,  pp. 171-237. 
OECD, 1995. Employment Outlook 1995, Paris: OECD. 
OECD, 1998. Employment Outlook 1998, Paris: OECD. 
O’HEARN, D., 1998. Inside the Celtic Tiger: the Irish Economy and the Asian Model, London: Pluto 
Press.  
O’HEARN, D., 2003. “Macroeconomic Policy in the Celtic Tiger: a Critical Reassessment” in 
C. Coulter and S. Coleman (eds.), The End of Irish History? Critical Reflections on the Celtic 
Tiger, Manchester: Manchester University Press.   
   REFERENCES 89 
 
PAUGAM, S., 1996. “The Spiral of Precariousness: A Multidimensional Approach to the 
Process of Social Disqualification in France,” in G. Room, (ed.), Beyond the Threshold: The 
Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion, Bath: Policy Press. 
PAYNE, J., 1986. “Does Unemployment Run in Families? Some Findings from the General 
Household Survey”, Sociology, Vol. 21, No. 2,  pp. 199-214. 
 
 
 
 
RENDTEL, U., 1991. Weighting Procedures and Sampling Variance in Household Panels, European 
Science Foundation Scientific Network on Household Panel Studies, University of 
Essex, 11. 
ROBINSON, P. and  N. BURKITT, 2001. “The Challenge of Full Employment” in N. 
Burkitt (ed.), A Life’s Work: Achieving Full and Fulfilling Employment, London: Institute for 
Public Policy Research. 
ROOM, G. J., 2000. “Social Exclusion, Solidarity and the Challenge of Globalisation”, 
International Journal of Social Welfare , Vol. 8,  pp. 166-174.  
RUSSELL, H and B. NOLAN, 1999. “Longitudinal Employment, Social Welfare and Social 
Exclusion” in V. Verma et al., Flexible Labour and its Impact on Earnings and Poverty, Final 
Report to Eurostat.  
RUSSELL, H. and M. P. CORCORAN, 2000. The Experience of Those Claiming the One-Parent 
Family Payment: A Qualitative Study, in DSCFA, Review of the One-Parent Family 
Payment, Dublin: Stationery Office. 
RUSSELL, H. and P. J. O’CONNELL, 2001. “Getting a Job in Europe: the Transition from 
Unemployment to Work Among Young People in Nine European Countries”, Work 
Employment and Society, Vol. 15, No. 1. pp. 1-24. 
RUSSELL, H., E. SMYTH, M. LYONS, P. J. O’CONNELL, 2002. Getting out of the House: 
Women Returning to Employment, Education and Training, Dublin: Liffey Press. 
RYAN, A. B., 2003. “Contemporary Discourse of Working, Earning and Spending: 
Acceptance, Critique and the Bigger Picture”, in C. Coulter and S. Coleman, (eds.), The 
End of Irish History? Critical Reflections on the Celtic Tiger, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.   
TOWNSEND, P., 1979. Poverty in the United Kingdom, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
WARR, P., 1987. Work, Unemployment and Mental Health, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
WHELAN, C. T., R. LAYTE, B. MAÎTRE, and B. NOLAN, 2001. “Income, Deprivation 
and Economic Strain: An Analysis of the European Community Household Panel,” 
European Sociological Review,  Vol. 17, No. 4,  pp. 357-372. 
WHELAN, C. T., R. LAYTE, B. MAÎTRE, and B. NOLAN, 2003. “Persistent Income 
Poverty and Deprivation in the European Union: An Analysis of the First Three Waves 
of the European Community Household Panel”, Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 
1-32. 
WILSON, J., 1987. The Truely Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
